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Message from the Editors 
 
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on 
Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary 
mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting edge research on Irregular 
Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) 
curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars 
together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array of 
violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is part of 
an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-
renowned academics, case studies, research papers, articles and books. 
Our aim is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive 
curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the 
challenges of the post-9/11 world. 
Dr. Richard Shultz is the author of this case study, which 
examines how the Marine Corps was able to learn from and adapt to 
conditions on the ground in Anbar province from 2006–2008, 
developing a three-dimensional strategy that resulted in stability from 
previous chaos and overwhelming violence. The author views this 
success through the lens of organizational theory, discussing the 
barriers to change in military organizations and the characteristics of 
organizations that are able to learn. The Marines’ focus on learning, 
adaptability, and institutional memory are seen as keys to their success 
in Anbar. Ten lessons are drawn from this case that relate to the future 
irregular conflict environment and to the efficacy of counterinsurgency, 
engagement, and counterterrorism as instruments for managing these 
future challenges for both US military and civilian security institutions. 
It is also important to note three critical caveats to this case 
study. First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the 
author and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, 
the Naval War College or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been 
made to correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately 
responsible for the content of this case study. Third, the study questions 
presented in all CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion 
on a wide variety of topics including strategic, operational, and tactical 




matters as well as ethical and moral questions confronted by operators 
in the battlefield.  The point is to make these case studies part of an 
evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students 
preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show 
them the dilemmas that real people faced in high-pressure situations.  
Finally, in addition to a range of teaching questions that are 
intended to serve as the foundation for classroom discussion, students 
conducting research on Iraq and Anbar Province will probably find the 
extensive bibliography at the end of the case helpful. Compiled by the 
case study author, the bibliography is a selection of the best books and 
articles on a range of related topics. We hope you find it useful and 
look forward to hearing your feedback on the cases and suggestions for 
how you can contribute to the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed 
Group’s mission here at the Naval War College. 
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A SITREP—situation report—for Anbar province as 2006 
devolved from the spring into the summer months would have had the 
following bleak bottom line: surging violence and grim prognoses. 
That was the overwhelming conventional wisdom. Enemy violence was 
skyrocketing, while almost every prediction for any U.S. success in 
Anbar was plummeting.  
This was even true for the chief of Marine intelligence in 
Anbar. Consider the devastating assessment in the late summer of that 
year completed by Col. Pete Devlin, the G-2 of the 1st Marine 
Expeditionary Force (I MEF). When his conclusions hit the front page 
of the Washington Post in September—“Situation Called Dire in West 
Iraq”—they rocked the White House.  
Here is the opening salvo from that account: “The chief of 
intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq recently filed a secret report 
concluding that the prospects for securing … Anbar province are dim 
and there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do.” Tom Ricks, who 
wrote the story, went on to note that one official familiar with the 
report said it “describes Anbar as beyond repair.” Another said “it 
concludes that the United States has lost in Anbar.”
1
 
Then in November, Devlin produced an update. It “said much 
of the same things” as its August antecedent.
2
 Statistics don’t lie, goes 
the old adage. And the G-2 could cite the growing number of violent 
attacks to support his position. They all pointed in the same direction. 
In these grim assessments of Anbar in 2006, ground zero was 
the city of Ramadi. Marines and soldiers who served in Anbar often 
referred to Ramadi as “al Qaedastan,” and with good reason. The city 
experienced a higher rate of weekly attacks than anywhere else in Iraq. 
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) controlled all of Ramadi except for the 
                                                          
1
 Thomas Ricks, “Situation Called Dire in West Iraq,” Washington Post, 
September 11, 2006 
2
 Col. Peter Devlin, oral history interview conducted by Kurtis Wheeler for the 
U.S. Marine Corps History Division, January 31, 2007, transcript, 9. 




embattled Government Center, which was held by a company of 
Marines.  
On the mean streets of the capital, AQI ruled mercilessly. Tales 
of their cruelties were endless. And they enforced a forbidding and 
puritanical code of behavior on the local populace. Men could not 
shave. Girls could not go to school. Music was forbidden. Beauty 
parlors were closed. Get caught smoking and you could lose your 
fingers. 
The situation in fall 2006 looked hopeless. But on September 6, 
2007, an event occurred in Ramadi that would have been beyond the 
wildest of imaginations a year earlier. The mayor of the capital gave the 
signal for the start of what had been up to 2002 the city’s annual 5K 
race. Runners were going to compete once more on a course that runs 
through the winding streets of Ramadi, ending at the Government 
Center. In less than 12 months, Ramadi had been transformed from the 
most dangerous city in Iraq to one safe enough for its city fathers to 
sponsor a 5K race!  
How did such a transformation take place? This remarkable 
turn of events came about because of the course of action initiated by I 
MEF as it took over Anbar in the spring of 2006. It changed the 
concept of operations for the fight against the insurgency. In 2007, the 
2nd Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) built on and expanded what 
I MEF initiated.  
And by the time I MEF returned in to Anbar in early 2008 for 
its third round in the Sunni heartland, things had dramatically changed, 
recalled its commander, Maj. Gen. John Kelly. The province was 
remarkably different from the one he left after his initial deployment in 
2004 as the assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division. At that 
time, the division found itself in a rapidly escalating and bloody fight. 
Kelly recalled that when he left Iraq in early 2005 “there were roughly 
400 violent events a week in Anbar.” But “when I returned in February 
2008 that number was down to 50 attacks per week.”
3
 
                                                          
3
 Maj. Gen. John Kelly, presentation at Fletcher School (Tufts University) 
roundtable, “Marine Generals Discuss Anbar 2006,” May 2, 2010, 
http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/issp/Video.shtml.  




By the end of 2008, Kelly asserted that Anbar had advanced 
well into the post-conflict phase to normalcy. Violent actions “were 
down to eight or nine a week.” And that number “held for the last five, 
six months” of the year: “AQI had to commute into Anbar to blow 
something up … If they tried to stay in a city the people very quickly 
would identify them.” That told the general it was now “appropriate to 
use the term victory in Anbar.”
4
 
Victory in Anbar! How did the Marines do it? And how were 
they able to do so a year before the success of the Surge and the 
counterinsurgency strategy upon which it was based? When I MEF first 
deployed to Anbar in March 2004, its campaign plan bore little 
resemblance to the conflict in which it soon found itself embroiled. By 
the end of that year, the fight settled into a deadly and protracted 
business as the insurgency burgeoned. And, as noted above, by the fall 
of 2006 many had given up on Anbar. 
And still the Marines prevailed. What allowed them to do so? 
Why were they able to learn and adapt? And how should we understand 
the different elements of the three-dimensional strategy they employed 
there, which was an outgrowth of Marine learning and adapting? To 
answer these questions we will employ a diagnostic construct drawn 
from the literature on organizational learning. Propositions and 
concepts found in those texts provide analytic tools that can help 
decipher and comprehend the outcome in Anbar.  
 
A. How Organizations Learn 
The texts on organizational learning and change are dominated 
by the business and management disciplines.
5
 There also is a segment 
of the literature in security studies that addresses the related subjects of 




 Among the most often cited are ones by Chris Argyris and Peter Senge, as 
well as the classic studies of James March. See, for example, Argyris, On 
Organizational Learning (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999); Senge, 
The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New 
York: Doubleday, 1990); and March, Decisions and Organizations (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991) and Organizations, 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 








 A common theme running through 
these studies is the axiom that learning, innovation, and change comes 
hard to large organizations in general, and to military ones in particular. 
 
Roadblocks to Change 
What are the barriers that make change in military 
organizations problematical? In a recent study, Lifting the Fog of 
Peace, Janine Davidson identified three prevailing explanations of why 
adapting and innovating is so difficult.
8
 The first two are drawn from 
organizational and bureaucratic theory.
9
 Those utilizing organizational 
theory to assess military institutions find innate rigidity and strong 
resistance to change. This is attributed to the formalized norms, 
standard operating procedures, and routine ways that large 
organizations do things. Those processes often serve as barriers to 




                                                          
6
 See Richard Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, 
El Salvador, and the Drug War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); John Nagl, 
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2002); Janine Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2010); and Gordon Sullivan and Michael Harper, Hope is Not 
a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America’s Army (New 
York: Random House, 1996). 
7
 See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and 
Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); 
Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Deborah Avant, "The Institutional 
Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars," International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (December 1993) and Elizabeth Kier, 
Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) 
8
 Davidson summarizes the organizational theory explanation as follows: “in 
this model, even when actors within a military organization desire a change in 
strategy or doctrine, structural mechanisms would likely mitigate against it.” 
Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace, Chpt. 1. 
9
 These have their origins in Graham Allison’s classic study of decision 
making and his utilization of the texts on organizational behavior to explain 
the Cuban missile crisis: Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, 2
nd
 ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). 
10
 Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace, p. 11. 




Bureaucratic politics specialists find yet other impediments to 
change. Davidson notes that “military leaders, like the leaders of other 
large organizations, seek to promote the importance of their 
organization and to preserve the organization’s distinct organization 
essence” or central mission. Challenges to that central mission are 
likely to be resisted unless the leadership comes to see that change will 




Finally, there are the constraints imposed by organizational 
culture. Specialists on the topic like Richard Downie find that 
institutional memory and history, key factors that shape organizational 
culture, frequently impede the organization’s capacity to innovate and 
change. “When the norms, SOPs, and doctrines” of an organization 
“become widely accepted and practiced” they will “form … the 
organization’s institutional memory.” That memory is then socialized 
into its members, making the organization “normally resistant to 
change.”
 12
 Yet more Chinese walls! 
In spite of these impediments, large organizations can learn and 
change. Davidson finds that militaries “change in response to three 
catalysts: (1) external pressure, (2) the opportunity or need to grow 
and/or survive, and (3) failure.”
13
 But innovation does not “happen 
easily or automatically” because “militaries tie their cultural identities 
to specific roles or have career structures that fail to reward (or even 
punish) new ways of thinking.”
14
 
In Anbar, the Marine Corps bucked these impediments to adapt 
and change. To understand why they were able adapt and employ a 
three-dimensional strategy that included the “clear, hold, build” phases 
of counterinsurgency, tribal engagement to solidify local security, and 
counterterrorism operations to attack the insurgent’s secret 
                                                          
11
 Ibid., p. 13. Also see Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1967) and James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy (New York: Basic Books, 
1989). 
12
 Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and the Drug War, p. 23-24. 
13
 Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace, p. 12. 
14
 Ibid., p. 18-19. 




underground network, a brief discussion of the tenets of organizational 
learning is necessary.  
 
The Learning Process 
Many definitions of organizational learning can be found in 
business and management texts. But for our purposes it is Richard 
Downie’s that is best suited for assessing the Marine campaign in 
Anbar. An organization demonstrates an aptitude to learn, he proposes, 
when it “uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience 
to adjust institutional norms, doctrine, and procedures in ways designed 
to minimize gaps in performance and maximize future successes.”
15
 
This description captures the essence of what it means to be a learning 
organization. 
 Barbara Levitt and James March magnify what Downie 
proposes. They describe organizational learning as “routine-based, 
history-dependent, and target-oriented. Organizations are seen as 
[demonstrating] learning by encoding inferences from history into 
routines that guide behavior.” Where do those inferences come from? 
Learning organizations draw them from “direct experience” and from 
“the experience of others.” Having done so, they “develop conceptual 
frameworks or paradigms for interpreting that experience” and turning 




These two definitions serve as the starting point for assessing 
why an organization does or does not learn. Institutional learning 
                                                          
15
 Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and the Drug War, p. 22. 
16
 Barbara Levitt and James March, “Organizational Learning,” Annual Review 
of Sociology (1988), p. 319. Since it was published, it has come to be 
considered one of the seminal works on organizational learning. According to 
one assessment, it “has been cited more than 3,000 times in a wide variety of 
other literatures and by essentially every subsequent article seeking to build or 
contribute to the literature on learning. The paper makes a major theoretical 
contribution by re-framing a large subset of the broader literature on 
organizations in terms of organizational learning in ways that provide a 
synthetic foundation for further work.” 
http://acawiki.org/Organizational_learning. 




theory, Downie explains, describes “the systemic process by which 
organizations either learn and change their doctrine, norms, or standard 
procedures to act on that learning or disregard the information and 
retain their doctrine, norms, and standard operating procedures.”
17
 
This systemic process is illustrated by learning theorists 
through models depicting a cyclical course of action that involves 
several steps. The illustration in Figure 1 was developed by Downie to 






Figure 1: The Institutional Learning Cycle 
 
Downie’s model outlines the steps in the process through 
which learning and adaptation is possible. It begins with members of 
the organization recognizing that there are performance gaps that can 
                                                          
17
 Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and the Drug War, p. 34. 
18
 Ibid., p. 38. 




only be redressed through adaptation and change. To do so, the 
organization has to acquire and process information in order to pinpoint 
alternatives.
19
 Based on these developments, the “organization assesses 
and interprets the discoveries or evaluations made by individual 
members, and if deemed valid through consensus, explores options to 
resolve the anomalous situation.” Resolution of those anomalies will 
take the form of actions that “adapt organizational behavior” through 
changes in organizational “norms, doctrine, or SOPs.”
20
  
The cyclical process just described outlines the steps by which 
an organization can learn and adapt. But what the learning literature 
tells us is that the real world contains many factors that undermine this 
prototype in various ways. And many of those factors have their origins 
in the nature and structure of the organization itself. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to deduce from that literature the characteristics or attributes 
that, if present in an organization, can facilitate learning, adaptation, 
and change. 
 
Characteristics of Learning Organizations 
Organizations that successfully navigate the learning cycle 
illustrated above to successfully address performance gaps have the 
following six characteristics.  
First, they place a high premium on adaptation and change. 
These are key organizational norms—core competences—and not just 
platitudes. They are a part of the organization’s foundation and 
disposition, and serve as a prescribed way of thinking and acting. 




                                                          
19
 Davidson notes that “some organizations actively promote the collection and 
dissemination of new information, while others rigidly adhere to standard 
operating procedures and ignore new information—especially if that 
information challenges existing paradigms and norms.” Lifting the Fog of 
Peace, p. 19-20 
20
 Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and the Drug War, p. 34-35. 
21
 Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning 
Organization. 




Second, a proficiency to innovate, improvise, and respond to 
the unexpected is socialized into the members of the organization. 
Members learn roles, methods, and modes of behavior that prepare 
them to respond to unexpected and unforeseen challenges. Nagl 
believes that military organizations can be prepared in this manner. He 
found that this was true for the British army during the colonial period. 
It was structured “precisely to deal with the unexpected” and was 
“actively expected to innovate.”
22
 
Third, organizations that are able to manage uncertainty are 
equipped with “tools … to make sense of the situations they face.”
23
 
These include, explains Senge, the capacity to acquire and analyze the 




Fourth, the acquisition of information and knowledge initially 
comes from direct experience. March and Levitt call this “learning by 
doing.” A second source is through study. Davidson terms the 
combination of these two methods “experiential learning”: “hands-on 
activities” and “intellectual reflection (reading, listening, and 
thinking).” A third method is that of understanding gained through an 
organization’s informal networks, where the voluntary sharing of 
“ideas and solutions” takes place.
25
 
Fifth, routines capture these learning experiences over time and 
embed them into the organization through socialization, education, and 
professionalization. March and Levitt explain that organizations do so 
by “encoding inferences … into routines that guide behavior.” Routines 
include the “rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies 




Sixth, memory is likewise a key institutional characteristic of a 
learning organization. Lessons from past experiences are codified into 
                                                          
22
 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 220-21. 
23
 Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning 




 Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace, p. 25-26. 
26
 Levitt and James March, “Organizational Learning,” p. 320. 




memory, which can be consulted, retrieved, and utilized. They become 
not just “standards of good professional practice” but a “shared 




B.  Anbar Case Study 
The characteristics of a learning organization provide a 
diagnostic construct through which to assess how the Marine Corps 
was able to adapt and succeed in Anbar. All military institutions are 
steeped in tradition and develop idiosyncratic cultures that shape the 
way they operate. This is true of the Marine Corps. And a mainstay 
among Corps tradition is the premium placed on learning and adapting 
as a core competency.  
In First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps, 
Victor Krulak underscored this commitment to learning and adapting. 
He did so through a number of historical examples that run the gambit 
from imaginative changes in strategy and operational concepts to the 
development of inventive weaponry and equipment. What stands out in 
each vignette is learning and adapting.
28
 Krulak identifies several 
attributes “that constitute the identity of the Marine Corps.”
29
 Three of 
these include the capacity to think and reflect, to innovate, and to 
improvise, all of which correlate with organizational learning. 
Moreover, because Marines expect to be first in the fight, 
Krulak explains, they assume they will find themselves initially 
engaged without a clear understanding of the context or the enemy. The 
“war you prepare for,” writes Krulak, “is rarely the war you get.”
30
 As a 
result, Marines learn roles, methods, and modes of behavior to respond 
to situations marked by ambiguity, uncertainty, and unforeseen 
challenges.  
This approach is infused into training and professional 
education. James Warren observes in his USMC combat history how, 
beginning at the Basic School for officers, “training exercises” foster 




 Victor Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps 
(Annnapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999). 
2929
 Ibid. See parts I-III. 
30
 Ibid., p. 137. 




“adaptability, boldness, and self-criticism.”
31
 And through formal and 
informal study of their history, Marines learn that these core principles 
have served them well. The Marine Corps is “history-dependent,” 
which is consistent with March and Levitt’s observation that a key part 




In sum, the Marine Corps appears to have an organizational 
culture that underscores learning and embeds lessons from its history 
into the Corps memory. That history is rife with examples of at first 
being caught in the fog of war—but then, having learned from 
knowledge gained in the fight, being flexible enough to make 
adjustments, overcome gaps in performance, and be successful.  
The narrative that follows seeks to explain how the Marine 
Corps was able to successfully adapt and change in Anbar by tracing 
the process through which their campaign unfolded between 2004 and 
2008. The study will highlight key junctures where learning and 
adapting took place and change followed. It finds that the 
organizational culture of the Marine Corps, and its attention to the 
tenets of learning outlined above, played an important role in the Anbar 
campaign. The case study will be divided into the following parts: 
 
 Part two describes the background and contest to the conflict. It 
begins with an overview of Anbar, highlighting its cultural, social 
and political identity. This is followed by a chronicling of the 
policy mistakes the U.S. made in 2003 in Iraq and how those 
missteps set the conditions for the fight between the insurgents and 
the Marines.  
 Part three provides profiles of the actors involved in the 
conflict. It begins with the armed groups that made up the 
insurgent coalition that emerged in Anbar in 2003–2004. Who 
were they, and what were their aims and goals? How were they 
organized, and how did they operate? What were the differences 
between the insurgent factions? Next is described the composition 
                                                          
31
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32
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 Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and how it prepared 
for its initial deployment to Anbar in the spring of 2004 and the 
fight that ensued during that year. 
 Parts four to six present an operational-level analysis of the 
Marine campaign in Anbar. That fight with the insurgents is 
assessed through the analytic lens of organizational learning and 
adaptation. A systematic examination of the changes in the 
strategies executed by the different MEFs over the four years 
period is untaken. The goal is to bring to light how the Marines 
learned and adapted and ultimately prevailed in the midst of a 
brutal irregular war that they did not initially understand, and how 
they brought together a three-dimensional strategy to do so. That 
strategy, which consisted of the counterinsurgency phases of 
“clear, hold, build,” tribal engagement to expand the operating 
force available to the MEFs to ensure local security, and targeted 
counterterrorism aimed at degrading al Qaeda’s clandestine 
apparatus, were all critical to their success.  
Other scholars have argued that success in Anbar was due 
to only one or two of these dimensions. For example, Lindsey and 
Petersen stress the role of tribal mobilization and write that Marine 
learning in Anbar “proceeded through trial and error in the 
absence of standardized COIN doctrine.”
33
 They are referring to 
the fact that I MEF was well on its way to degrading AQI in Anbar 
before FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, which served as the strategic 
basis for the Surge, was finalized and officially released in 
December 2006. But as will be seen in this narrative, I MEF’s 
2006 campaign plan was based on the long-standing COIN 
precepts of “clear, hold, and build.” They did not need FM 3-24 
Counterinsurgency to tell them about it. Those precepts were well 
understood by I MEF, but they had to be contextualized in their 
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campaign plan for Anbar. And that entailed tribal engagement and 
coordination with the counterterrorism units of Task Force 145. 
 Part seven offers closing reflections, drawn from the narrative. 
They are presented as informed observations taken from the Anbar 
campaign that relate to the future conflict environment, the nature 
of armed groups, and the efficacy of counterinsurgency as a 




 II. Background and Context 
 
To fight successfully in the irregular warfare setting of Iraq’s 
Al Anbar province, Marines needed a cultural understanding of the 
local population, how they perceived and thought about their world, 
and the ways in which they organized social and political relations to 
survive in it. But the Marines deploying to Anbar in March 2004 were 
not equipped with such an appreciation.  
However, over the next four years they were able to gain an on-
the-job understanding of Anbar and to put it to good use. In order to 
appreciate what they learned to turn the situation around, it is necessary 
to become familiar with the cultural values, social and political 
groupings, and worldview of the people who live there—the Iraqi 
Sunni Arabs. Their persona, which the Marines had to come to 
understand and engage, is based on “ethnicity and language, religion, 




A. Anbar Narrative 
Located in central Iraq, Anbar province is the largest of Iraq’s 
18 governorates. No one really knows how many people reside there. 
Today, the estimates hover around two to three million. The population 
is concentrated in seven of Anbar’s eight districts: Abu Graib, Fallujah, 
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Ramadi, Hit, Haditha, Anah, and Al-Qa’im. Within these territories, the 
majority of the residents live in the cities and towns that dot the 
Euphrates River. 
To operate in Anbar, one must come to know the longstanding 
beliefs and values that unite the Sunni Arabs that live there, shaping the 
worldview through which they interpret events and take actions. Those 
beliefs and values are derived from three sources: Bedouin tribal 
traditions, Islam, and Arab culture.
35
 Awareness of these elements of 
identity and how they interact with each other and the worldview they 
foster is the starting point for engagement in Al Anbar. 
 
Bedouin Traditions, Islamic Principles, and Arab Culture 
Starting in the 1960s, social scientists predicted that tribes and 
clans found in traditional societies were passing from the world scene 
in the wake of modernity.
36
 Evidently, the tribes in Anbar did not get 
the word, because when the U.S. intervened in 2003 they were still 
around, operating on principles of behavior that lie deep in their 
Bedouin roots. Anbar’s Dulaymi tribal confederation’s communal rules 
and ethos are illustrative. Solidarity, loyalty, and honor are keystones of 
their tribal value system.  
These values took root long ago and shaped a code of behavior 
that remains embedded in the character of present-day Anbar tribes. 
Indeed, the modern-day adherents of these precepts often follow rather 
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exacting conventions that creates a deep sense of responsibility to the 
tribe. 
For example, bringing to justice anyone who violates 
individual or group honor is central to this ethos. Revenge, blood feuds, 
and even war can serve as the means for addressing such 
transgressions. Often, revenge is formally prescribed as the duty of all 
of the tribes’ male members.
37
 Nonviolent means can also be employed 
to settle disputes. Among other Bedouin traditions maintained by the 
tribes of Anbar is respect for martial feats, military achievement, and a 
readiness to resort to the use of force.
38
  
Islam likewise has had a major influence on Anbar’s tribes. To 
understand the Islamic element of the tribes’ identity, the Marines 
deploying in 2004 needed to drill down. What they would have found 
is that no one interpretation of Sunni Islam exists. Rather, most Sunnis 
subscribe to one of four main schools of thought—Maliki, Shafi’i, 
Hanbali, and Hanafi—and knowing which one predominates in Anbar 
is crucial.  
The differences among these four perspectives turn on how 
stringently Islamic principles are interpreted and practiced. The strictest 
is the Hanbali school, established in the ninth century. Its popularity 
has fluctuated since its founding. In modern times it reemerged, first in 
the nineteenth century with the Wahhabis and then in the twentieth 
century in the guise of the Salafi Islamic revival.  
The Salafi movement is made up of Sunni Muslims drawn 
mainly from the Hanbali school. Many of the most puritanical groups 
found in the Muslim world are Salafis. It is important to note that the 
vast majority are nonviolent. While they believe in a strict adherence to 
the Quran and the Sunna, they do not advocate the use of violence 
against those who do not accept their beliefs.
39
 However, some Salafists 
do, and today they include al Qaeda and its associated movements. 
                                                          
37
 For a detailed discussion, see Joseph Ginat, Blood Revenge: Family Honor, 
Mediation, and Outcasting (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 1997). 
38
 John Jandora, Militarism in Arab Society: An Historical and Bibliographical 
Sourcebook (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), xxii. 
39
 For a detailed assessment of the Salafi movement and its different factions, 
see Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in 




The tribes that make up the Dulaymi confederation in Anbar 
are not Hanbalis or their Salafi offshoot. Rather, they are largely 
Hanifas, the most liberal of the four schools.
40
 Generally known to be 
more moderate in their Islamic orientation, Hanafis are considered the 
school most receptive to modern ideas. Such an understanding had 
operational significance to Marines deploying to Anbar in 2004.  
Finally, Arab culture is the third element of the identity puzzle 
that shapes the worldview of the inhabitants of Anbar. The identity of 
Iraq’s Sunni Arabs is deeply influenced by the narrative of modern 
Arab ethno-nationalism. They had lived for centuries under Ottoman 
domination and, following World War I, within a British-imposed state 
legitimized by the League of Nations.  
The state that finally emerged in Iraq in 1932 was dominated 
by Arab Sunni elites. The details of this will not be recounted here. We 
need only note that from that time until 2003, the Sunnis ruled the Iraqi 
state based on an identity that featured modern Arab nationalist themes 
that included a fierce sense of independence and resistance to outside 
interference. 
These three enduring elements of identity—Bedouin tribal 
traditions, Islam, and Arab culture—have each reinforced a self-
perception of Anbar’s Sunni tribes as an elite community, superior to 
Iraq’s other ethnic and religious groups. And that self-perception was 
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reinforced by the fact that Sunnis dominated Iraq’s social and political 
order before and during the decades of Ba’athist rule.  
Consequently, it should have come as no surprise that a sudden 
loss of that status could translate into armed resistance if actions were 
not taken to forestall it. Deciphering these elements of identity, how 
they interact with each other, the beliefs and perceptions they generate, 
and the rules of behavior they foster was the starting point for Marines 
deploying to Anbar in March 2004.  
 
Social Organization and Political Power 
In the Middle East of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
imperial powers and indigenous strongmen regularly sought to 
consolidate state power. Equally often they encountered stiff tribal 
resistance to their centralizing schemes. The ability of tribes to resist 
depended on the strength of their own solidarity, the political landscape 
of the day, the power of occupiers or national authorities, and the 
harshness of the times.  
Within this context, tribal defiance constituted a longstanding 
feature of the Iraqi landscape. More often than not, tribes turned back 
assaults on their autonomy, as even Saddam and his Ba’athist cronies 
found out.
41
 After seizing power, they immediately denigrated “sheikhs 
and tribalism … as the epitome of backwardness.” Both stood in the 
way of “building a new society” and “creating a [new] Arab man.” 
Sheikhs were gunned down or jailed, and tens of thousands of tribal 




In spite of these brutal measures, tribalism remained the core 
around which local Iraqi society revolved. Out of necessity, Saddam 
not only had to accept that reality but also depend on it to survive two 
disastrous wars of his own making. From the Sunni Triangle he 
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recruited men to fill the leadership ranks of the Republican Guards, the 
Special Republican Guards, and the various other intelligence and 
security units. And the tribes of the Dulaymi confederation of Anbar 
provided more than their share, which brought many advantages. 
However, gaining status had its downside, for Saddam automatically 
saw the confederation as posing a threat. Living in constant fear of 
losing control to the same kind of cabal he had helped orchestrate in the 
past, Saddam inflicted periodic bloodlettings on the Dulaymis to 
prevent such subterfuge, whether real or imagined. 
While Operation Iraqi Freedom swept Saddam from power, it 
did not alter the social context in Anbar. Sunni tribes and sheikhs 
retained their local authority, power, and guns. Their militias remained 
intact and were strengthened by returning cashiered Iraqi Army vets. 
The tribe remained the principal social organization and source of 
political power.  
Consequently, an important question for the U.S. in 2003 was 
how the tribes of Anbar would react to regime change, especially when 
it meant the loss of power and status. Those tribes were the center of 
gravity in the province; they were the central social and political unit 
long before and during Ba’athist rule. And they remained pivotal in the 
power vacuum that followed Saddam’s demise.  
The central U.S. goal should have been to keep them out of the 
hands of both the former regime elements and the Salafi jihadists led by 
Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi. Each had taken up arms against U.S. forces. If 
either was to turn resistance into a robust and protracted struggle in 
Anbar, it needed the help of the tribes. They were essential if a dogged 
fight against U.S. occupation was to be waged.  
 
Tribal Engagement 
It was not written in the stars that either the former regime 
elements or Zarqawi and the Salafi Jihadists would form a viable 
coalition with the tribes of Anbar. Those tribes were not the natural 
allies of either. But to be able to prevent such alliances form forming, 
the U.S. had to engage the Anbar tribes on their terms, based on their 
narrative. And that required developing a tribal engagement strategy 
that reflected an understanding of that narrative. The operational do’s 




and don’ts contained in Figure 2 constituted the foundation, the 
indispensable starting point, of that engagement strategy.  
No such understanding informed the calculus of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) in the days and months following 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Rather, the CPA and its head, Paul Bremer, 
made all the wrong moves in 2003 when it came to Anbar. It would be 
left to the Marines in 2004 to pick up the pieces. But to do so, they had 
to base their operational plans on an understanding of the cultural 
context of Anbar and how to work inside the tribal system that 










Figure 2: Operational Do’s and Don’ts for Tribal Engagement 




B. All the Wrong Moves 
Just before entering Iraq as part of the 2003 American 
intervention to oust Saddam, a young Marine asked then Brig. Gen. 
John Kelly what would happen to Iraq after the coalition forces beat the 
Iraqi military. As he recounted later, Kelly had a confident response: 
“Well, we’re America, the greatest nation on Earth. There is probably 
battalions worth of engineers and specialists and all that, and as we 
move north and take the regime down, they’ll come in behind us and 
they’ll establish democracy and take over the running of the country.”
43
 
But the battalions of specialists never followed. Planning for 
the Iraq war focused on overthrowing Saddam Hussein. The 
administration never developed a clear plan of what should happen the 
next day. Rather than facilitating the transition to reconstruction, post-
conflict actions actively set that process back and threw fuel on a 
budding violent resistance to U.S. occupation. In 2003, the U.S. made 
all the wrong moves, and this had a serious impact on Anbar Province. 
The story of the failure of pre-war planning for the “day after” 
Saddam was ousted has been told in several volumes.
44
 The story of 
retired Gen. Jay Garner and the Office of Humanitarian and 
Reconstruction Assistance (OHRA) will not be recounted here. Suffice 
it to say they lacked the resources necessary to do almost anything. And 
then, at the end of April, Garner was replaced by L. Paul Bremer. 
Bremer had little knowledge of Iraq and no experience in post-
conflict reconstruction. But under his direction of the CPA, the 
American occupation took hold. In doing so, he was at the center of 
several ill-conceived decisions that fueled armed resistance in Anbar. 
What follows is a brief summation of those wrong moves. 
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Purging the Ba’athists 
Bremer’s first major decision set the tone. On May 16, 2003, 
he released a blanket de-Ba’athification edict. Order 1 dissolved the 
Ba’ath Party, removed the four most senior ranks from their jobs, and 
banned them from working for the government in the future; it also 
forbade all former Ba’athists, even junior members, from serving in the 
top three levels of government.
45
 
According to Bremer, the order affected 20,000 people.
46
 
Others estimated that 40,000 or 60,000 Ba’ath Party members lost their 
jobs; given the impact of unemployment on families, the number 
affected was several times that.
47
 Anthony Cordesman later said: 
“Nobody [in the CPA] made any effort to survey how many people 
would be excluded … it went down to far.”
48




The biggest losers were the Sunnis. Gone were their jobs, their 
family income, their children’s schoolteachers, and their role in 
governance. Moreover, the decision sent a mailed fist to Anbar 
province and the Sunni Triangle: The postwar order was about 
removing Sunnis from national life. And as they looked to Baghdad, 
the Sunnis saw the U.S. putting the Shia in their place. 
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 For example, two-thirds of the top people at the Health Ministry had to 
leave. One-quarter of the directors of various state-owned companies were 
sacked. Thousands of schoolteachers were unceremoniously fired, leaving 
schools in some Sunni regions with decimated faculties. In the Saddam era, 
teachers had a hefty incentive to join the party, as they received a bonus that 
multiplied their paychecks. At least 1,700 staffers and professors in Iraq’s 
university system were fired. De-Ba’athification also effectively decapitated 
the Iraqi Police Services. 




Cashiering the Army 
Bremer’s second major decision was to disband the Iraqi 
Army, demobilizing 250,000 to 350,000 personnel. CPA Order 2 sent a 
dark message to the Sunni-dominated officer corps, who 
unceremoniously lost paychecks and prestige. This move ran counter to 
standard thinking about how to handle combatants in post-conflict 
operations. According to one U.S. army colonel knowledgeable in these 
matters, “Anyone who has done post-conflict work says do not get rid 
of the military. You’ve got to control them. If you don’t control them, 
you don’t know what they’re going to do.”
50
 But with Order 2, the CPA 
sent into the streets of Iraq thousands of unemployed armed men. 
Bremer later announced a plan to pay stipends to out-of-work 
soldiers, but by that time the damage had been done.
 51
 The dissolution 
of the Iraqi Army sent a second foreboding message to the Sunnis of 
Anbar and beyond, who already felt marginalized.  
 
Writing off the Tribes and Sheikhs 
Bremer wrote in his memoir that he knew from diplomatic 
service in Afghanistan and Malawi how important tribes are in some 
countries. During his time in Iraq, he said he came to see how 
important tribal ancestry was to many Iraqis. But he seems to have also 
believed that tribal leaders would just go along with the new power 
configuration in Baghdad. “The tribes had a reputation for respecting 
power and had always been acutely aware of who was up and who was 
down. They were likely to support whoever exercised authority in 
Baghdad,” he wrote.
52
 The history of Iraq would suggest otherwise. 
The attitude at the CPA was that to empower tribal leaders 
would take Iraq backwards. They were the antithesis of the modern 
regime Americans wanted to build. Noah Feldman, an advisor to the 
CPA in 2003, later recounted that tribal leaders had come to Bremer 
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offering to work with the CPA to help stabilize the country. “We told 
them, ‘No, we’re not going to take Iraq back to the Middle Ages.’”
53
  
Instead of working with the tribal leaders, the U.S. in 2003 
followed policies that alienated them. This was certainly true in 
Anbar.
54
 The idea that the traditional power of the Anbar sheikhs 
should be engaged to work with the CPA simply didn’t resonate with 
the powers in Baghdad. Just the opposite was the case. This was made 
clear in Bremer’s 2003 CPA-issued statement that “tribes are a part of 




Limiting Anbar Resources 
While Anbaris were being swept up in arrests and the military 
focus on kinetic tactics was inspiring anger, what they did not see early 
on were the basic bread-and-butter services that build goodwill and 
form the core of post-conflict program—jobs, electricity, government 
services, and more. And thenm after reconstruction aid arrived, the 
CPA sought to be even-handed with its use. What that meant was 
regions favored by Saddam got far less than they were used to. A case 
in point was electricity.  
Before the war, Saddam distributed electrical power much as 
he distributed political power. Places where he was strong got almost 
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all the power they needed, while the Shiite south was left in the dark.
56
 
To the CPA, that was unfair. Bremer signed an order requiring that 
electricity be evenly distributed.
57
 This effort to be even-handed, while 
laudable in principle, meant that in the Sunni triangle power levels fell 
to half of prewar levels.
58
  
From Anbar, Col. David Teeples wrote to Bremer to plead for 
more electricity, saying that the province’s supply is “our largest 
concern,” citing rolling blackouts and “turbulence within the 
community.” The lack of sufficient electricity in Anbar, Teeples wrote, 
was preventing factories from opening, spurring unemployment.
59
 It 
was another grim signal to the Sunnis of Anbar: Their fate in the “new 
Iraq” was going to be a dark one. 
 
Failure to Manage Sunni Fear 
While Sunnis comprise only one-fifth of the Iraqi population, 
they have dominated the country’s politics for hundreds of years. They 
had a lot to lose with the invasion. And with de-Ba’athification and the 
disbanding of the Iraqi Army, they did lose their traditional roles in 
national institutions, their income, their personal self-identity, and 
more. Moreover, they saw the Shia not just taking control of Baghdad’s 
power ministries but also asserting authority in those institutions that 
affect day-to-day life. 
In 2003, the CPA focused on gaining Shia support and keeping 
Kurdish support at the expense of managing Sunni fears. The CPA 
sought to correct Saddam’s wrongs by favoring the once-oppressed 
Shiites and Kurds at the expense of the once-ruling Sunnis. These 
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actions fed Sunni fears. What were needed were policies to manage 
those fears.  
Marine Lt. Gen. John Allen, who played a key role in the 
campaign in Anbar that led to the defeat of the al Qaeda-dominated 
insurgency, reflecting back on the policies described here as having 
created in 2004 “a perfect storm across Anbar,” providing “the perfect 
opportunity for AQ [al Qaeda].”
60
 The U.S. had made all the wrong 
moves and it was left to the Marines, who were sent to Anbar in March 
2004, to to pick up the pieces. 
 
 
Overarching Case Discussion Questions 
1. “The war you prepare for is seldom the war you get.”  
a. If this is true, what does this case study and your 
experience suggest are the enduring principles that 
operational and strategic leaders need to build into 
their planning processes?  
b. What key tools help operational and strategic leaders 
adapt to “the war they get?” 
 
2. This case study deliberately focuses on just one organization’s 
experience in one region in Iraq, the USMC in Anbar, but the 
applicability should be more generalizable. 
a. Are the Marines the only branch of the military that 
meets the six characteristics of a learning organization? 
Are the characteristics of a learning organization 
compatible with the structure and mindset of other 
branches of the military and intelligence communities? 
If not, can and should they be? 
b. How does this learning model compare to adaptive 
business models?  
                                                          
60
 Lt. Gen. John Allen, “Anbar Dawn: The Defeat of al Qaeda,” text of a 
lecture given at The Fletcher School, Tufts University (March 11, 2009), 28. 




c. What are the strengths and weaknesses of building 
adaptation into an organization? What factors does this 
capability depend on for success? 
d. How does this model compare to the learning cycle of 
armed groups (the insurgents in this case study)? Do 
they learn faster, adapt faster, or do they face similar 
bureaucratic and practical limitations? What forces 
them to adapt, and what can we learn from their 
experience? 
 
3. What was the effect of other factors in the success of the 
USMC in Anbar? This case study argues that success in Anbar 
was based on three pillars: USMC adaptation, the “Anbar 
Awakening” tribal movement, and the work of the special 
operations forces’ Task Force 145. Each had a particular role to 
play, and this case study identifies the roles and the interaction 
between these three factors. Key discussion questions include: 
a. What was the role of internal tribal dynamics and 
rivalries in the willingness of the Anbar tribes to work 
with the USMC? (See Section V.) 
b. What was the effect of the special operations forces’ 
Task Force 145 in helping to set the conditions for 
success in Anbar? (See Section VI.) 
c. How did the USMC’s learning model help them to 
capitalize on these opportunities? 
   




 III. Insurgents and Marines 
 
Those elements that came to comprise the insurgency in Anbar 
were not natural allies. They had differences in terms of why they took 
up arms and in the aims and goals they pursued. This is not surprising, 
given the history of insurgency, which has often been characterized by 
factional and internal rivalries that affect cohesion, cooperation, and 
effectiveness.  
The different groups that comprised the insurgency in Anbar 
followed this historical pattern. As will be delineated later, these 
differences would eventually come to be seen by the Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF) leadership as opportunities to exploit. But 
that understanding took time to materialize. 
 
A. The Insurgents 
The insurgency in Anbar included different groups of which 
there was considerable information on some, but next to nothing on 
others. This is not unusual in the shadowy world of armed groups. They 
are divided into two categories here: insiders and outsiders. The former 
came from within Anbar’s Sunni Arab community, and are subdivided 
as former Ba’athist regime elements and Sunni Arab rejectionists. 
However, it should be noted that these distinctions “on the ground” in 
Anbar were not so clear cut. Outsiders were comprised of foreign 
radical Islamists. But here also things were not clear cut; there was a 
homegrown element as well. 
 
Insiders: Former Ba’athist Regime Elements 
There was “compelling evidence,” writes Ahmed Hashim, that 
former Ba’athist regime members played “significant political and 
operational roles” in the insurgency in Anbar. While it was initially ad 
hoc, as it developed they adopted the Sunni Arab nationalist discourse 
as the motivation for armed resistance.
61
 Those who made up the 
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former Ba’athist regime elements of the insurgency came from the key 
coercive institutions that collectively kept the Ba’athist dictatorship in 
power.
62
 They adopted several noms de guerre including the General 
Command of the Armed Forces, Resistance and Liberation in Iraq; the 
Patriotic Front; and the High Command of the Mujahideen in Iraq. 
A July 2003 Ba’ath Party memo instructed these factions to 
establish “small and closed cells” and “transition to covert 
operations.”
63
 By early 2004 their attacks greatly escalated, and were 
increasingly sophisticated. They made extensive use of improvised 
explosive devices. Targets include police stations and other government 
facilities, oil pipelines, electrical plants, and military convoys, as well 
as Iraqi officials who cooperated with the U.S.  
That the former Ba’athist regime elements refused “to go down 
without a fight” was predictable. After all, they had everything to lose 
and also had the capacity to organize clandestine networks. Their goal 
was to raise the cost of remaining in Iraq for the U.S. and, ultimately, to 
force Washington to withdraw. 
 
Insiders: Sunni Rejectionists 
Sunni Arab rejectionists came from different backgrounds and 
joined the insurgency for different reasons. Their ranks included 
members of regular army units. Dating back to the Iran war, the 
professional officer’s corps of the army was drawn from Anbar and 
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other Sunni areas. Entire regiments came from Tikrit, Mosel, Ramadi, 
and Fallujah.  
The CPA cashiered them, along with the rest of the Army, and 
had no disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program 
to facilitate their transition to civilian life. DDR is difficult, even when 
planned for and resourced. But to ignore it completely, as the CPA did, 
drove former army officers into the ranks of the resistance out of 




Rejectionists also came from within the Dulaymi tribal 
confederation of Anbar. Their motives derived from longstanding tribal 
traditions that reject authority imposed from Baghdad, as well as Iraqi 
nationalism with its equally longstanding opposition to outside 
invading forces. These traditions of hostility towards outside interlopers 
and central authority were exacerbated by Sunni fear that in a new Iraq 
they would be greatly discriminated against as retaliation for their 
privileged status under Saddam Hussein. And the CPA did not help 
matters by making little effort to reach out to them.  
Also pushing the tribes to join the insurgency were U.S. tactics 
that included the use of excessive force against insurgent hideouts in 
Anbar. Not infrequently, these actions caused civilian casualties, 
triggering among the affected tribes a blood revenge responsibility for 
vengeance. Other missteps included the way U.S. forces searched 
private homes and detained suspects. These actions, said a Fallujah clan 
chief at the time, will make us “fight them to the death.”
65
  
In sum, Sunni rejectionists joined the insurgency for reasons of 
honor, tradition, revenge and national pride. To varying degrees, each 
of these factors inspired them to take up arms.  
 
Outsiders: Salafi Jihadists 
The U.S. invasion turned Iraq into a magnet for fighters from al 
Qaeda’s global Salafi jihad movement. As with Afghanistan in the 
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1980s, they were quickly attracted to Iraq.
66
 The Afghan fight was the 
initial defining moment for this movement, as Sageman explains: 
“Militants from all over the Muslim world finally met and interacted 
for lengthy periods of time. The common fight forged strong bonds 
among them. After the Soviets withdrew, these militants started to 
analyze their common problems within a more global perspective, 
transcending their countries of origin.”
67
 
In April 2003, Iraq became the central front in the Salafi global 
war when bin Laden called for its warriors to join the fight there. Over 
the next several months they started arriving on their own or via an 
underground network that Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi helped establish 
with indigenous Islamic radicals known as Ansar Al-Islam. Together 
they began moving Islamist “zealots to northern Iraq.”
68
 The key point 
of entry was through Syria. 
Zarqawi, a former Afghan mujahideen, returned to Afghanistan 
and established a training camp with funds in part provided by al 
Qaeda. He created Tawhid al-Jihad as an affiliate of al Qaeda that prior 
to 9/11 focused on Jordan, Israel, and Turkey. He also established 
networks in Europe to raise funds and arrange for the clandestine transit 
of Islamist fighters to various battle fronts. Zarqawi moved Tawhid al-
Jihad to Iraq following the U.S. invasion and became AQ’s de facto 
operational commander. While the size of his force was considered 
small by U.S. officials, it carried out the grizzliest attacks.  
In July 2003, Tawhid al-Jihad began an indiscriminate series of 
bloody attacks. It detonated a car bomb against the Jordanian Embassy. 
Next it sent a suicide attacker to the United Nations headquarters and 
murdered the UN’s top envoy in Iraq. This was followed by the murder 
of Shiite leader Muhammed Baqr al-Hakim. These actions gained 
Zarqawi international notoriety as the mastermind of al Qaeda’s 
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The Salafi jihadists in Iraq were comprised of both 
internationalists and homegrown warriors. One assessment of the 
former, drawn in early 2005 from Salafi websites, found the names of 
foreign jihaidist fighters who died in Iraq. Of the 154 names posted, 33 
were said to have died carrying out suicide attacks. Saudis constituted 
60% of the foreign jihadists killed and 70% of the suicide bombers.
70
 
Other records captured in Iraq for 2006–2007 show that Saudi Arabia 
was by far the most common nationality in this sample; 41% (244) of 
the 595 records that included the fighter’s nationality indicated they 
were of Saudi Arabian origin. Libya was the next most common 
country of origin, with 18.8% (112) of fighters listing their nationality 
stating they hailed from Libya.
71
 
Joining these international jihadists were their home-grown 
counterparts. Several Salafi armed groups appeared in 2003, including 
Ansar al-Sunnah and the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI). These groups 
were made up of individuals “with ties to or admiration for Osama bin 
Laden.” In Iraq, IAI “cooperated with Zarqawi’s group,” as did Ansar 
al-Sunnah.
72
 They benefited from Zarqawi’s skilled jihadists who 
worked on the ground with their Iraqi counterparts to provide training 
and operational know-how.  
 
B. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force 
In March 2004, the Marine Corps deployed part of the 1st 
Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) back to Iraq. It had first entered 
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Iraq on March 20, 2003, crossing the Iraq-Kuwait border as part of the 
coalition attack. On April 19, 2003, on the grounds of the dictator’s 
Tikrit palace, the commander of I MEF, Lt. Gen. James Conway, 
announced that full-scale combat operations were over. Until I MEF 
departed in the summer, it was involved in SASO—security and 
stability operations—in the Shia south. What they found there was an 
infrastructure decimated by years of purposeful neglect.  
SASO was not a mission for which it had prepared. 
Nevertheless, Marine units adapted, and when it was over, those 
involved were satisfied with the job they had done, believing they 
helped the Shia start on the long road to recovery. According to then 
Col. Joseph Dunford, who oversaw the SASO mission: “It worked 
pretty well … Things were going well in the south. And in each one of 
those cities … each of the commanders could point with some pride to 
the accomplishments and the progress they made.”
73
 
That experience, however, influenced how I MEF prepared for 
its return to Iraq, according to Col. James Howcroft, who was its 
intelligence chief at the time. “What we had done and the success we 
had in southern Iraq definitely colored our approach to going back to 
Anbar. We thought that what had worked in the south would work in 
the west as well,” he noted.
74
 As a result, “[We] thought we didn’t need 
artillery, we would not need tanks because we hadn’t needed them in 
southern Iraq.”
75
 When asked how he assessed the security environment 
in Anbar, Col. Howcroft said, “At the time it was considered generally 
permissive except for certain pockets. We knew Fallujah was bad.”
76
 
That assessment was reflected in I MEF’s campaign plan. It 
was based on the following assumptions: (1) the environment in Anbar 
was generally permissive and the population not hostile; (2) the 
experience in southern Iraq would serve as the basis for the new effort; 
(3) I MEF would build on what was believed to be a successful stability 
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operation carried out by the 82nd Airborne, but they would do so in a 
different and much less kinetic way; and (4) while they were likely to 
face some hostility, it was not an organized resistance or insurgency. 
Then Col. Dunford, the 1st Marine Division’s chief of staff, recalled 
that during the planning “we were not talking about an insurgency at 




Based on those suppositions, the campaign plan that I MEF 
drew up for Anbar left little doubt that its leadership believed they were 
embarking on a stability operation. Figure 3 shows the “15 plays,” as 
they were termed by the planners, that comprised that campaign plan. 
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Figure 3: The “Five Plays” 




C. Ugly Surprise 
I MEF found out quickly that its campaign plan was not what 
the conditions in Anbar required. The environment was not permissive 
but very kinetic. What accounted for this mismatch? The answer, in 
part, lies in the intelligence the MEF used to prepare for deployment. 
Reflecting back, the G-2 of I MEF explained that all the intelligence he 
saw led him to conclude that Anbar “was generally permissive except 




But even after I MEF was on the ground and realized it was not 
SASO, understanding the conflict context remained a conundrum, 
according to Brig. Gen. Kelly. He had a bird’s eye view of the evolving 
situation in Anbar. But trying to figure out that complex setting was not 
easy. As he watched the situation from Ramadi he posed the crucial 
question, one that would stump U.S. forces deployed to Iraq and their 
policy maker masters back in Washington for some time: “When do a 
bunch of guys that are trying to kill you turn into an insurgency?”
79
 In 
other words, when do you know you are facing an organized 
opposition, and how do you figure out who makes up its constituent 
parts?  
Gen. Kelly knew what he didn’t know! And I MEF found itself 
facing one of those ambiguous, uncertain, and unforeseen challenges 
that Marine forces have faced throughout the Corps history. Remember 
Krulak’s observation in First to Fight. Once more, Marines were 
engaged in a fight without a clear understanding of the context or of the 
enemy. The situation I MEF prepared for was not the one that 
confronted them in March 2004. Krulak’s warning proved true: The 
“war you prepare for is rarely the war you get.”
80
 
And if that was not bad enough, I MEF soon faced the Fallujah 
crisis in Anbar. From April through the November assault that took 
control of the city, the bulk of its forces were bogged down outside of 
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Fallujah for political reasons. At the same time, the insurgency 
burgeoned elsewhere in Anbar. There were just not enough I MEF 
forces to go around. As a result, in more instances than not, the Marines 
were reacting to insurgent moves. They did not have control of the 
ground throughout the province. And in Fallujah, the enemy was given 
a sanctuary from which to project operations for six months.  
The fight had settled into a deadly version of the arcade game 
Whac-a-Mole: Hit the insurgents hard in one location and they would 
withdraw, only to pop up somewhere else. They were using classic 
protracted irregular warfare tactics. Col. Howcroft, I MEFs intelligence 
chief, clearly recognized the reality of this situation. He explained, 
“Fallujah sort of put us back into our comfort zone and we did that 
[urban battle] quite well.” But he added that, in terms of the larger 
struggle for control of Anbar, “I think it truly, truly hurt us … We 
needed time to set the conditions to be successful in Anbar.” Fallujah 
prevented that from happening, and the insurgents capitalized on it. The 
bottom line for the G-2: “Fallujah took that time away; it set us back a 
year and a half, if not two years.”
81





1. Col. Kelly asked, “When do a bunch of guys that are trying to 
kill you turn into an insurgency?”  
2. What is your answer to this? 
3. Why is an insurgency more operationally and strategically 
dangerous than a “bunch of guys”? 
4. What are they key factors that help you identify that an 
organized armed resistance has formed? (See CIWAG case 
study Reading the Tea Leaves: Proto-Insurgency in Honduras 
by John D. Waghelstein.) 
5. What factors help to transform a “bunch of guys” into an 
“insurgent organization”? What learning process do they need 
to go through in order to transform and survive? 
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6. The above section emphasizes that you have to ask the right 
questions in order to find out the right answers, even when “the 
only constant is that the unexpected will always be present in 
the fight.” 
7. How can we discover our knowledge gaps?  
8. What are the key factors that the USMC needed to identify in 
this situation? (See CIWAG case study An Operator’s Guide to 
Human Terrain Teams by Norman Nigh.) 
9. Do these factors depend on the situation, or can this framework 
be developed into general guidelines? 
10. How can we teach the capacity to learn? Can this be turned into 
doctrine and the planning process? Or does this capability rest 
in the hands of skilled individuals? 
 
 
 IV. Learning 
 
Organizations able to manage uncertainty are equipped with 
“tools … to make sense of the situations they face.”
82
 These include the 
capacity to acquire appropriate information through firsthand 
experience or learning by doing in order to make adjustments to the 
mission. II MEF faced several key learning junctures in 2005, each of 
which affected how II MEF understood the fight in Anbar. And each 
had an important impact on how I MEF shaped its campaign plan for 
going back in 2006, based on what II MEF learned in 2005. 
 
A. Highly Persistent Conflict 
When II MEF arrived in early 2005, Anbar was neither secure 
nor stable. Rather, MEF intelligence concluded that the escalating 
violence the province experienced in 2004 would persist in 2005. And 
that “highly persistent unrest” quickly translated into casualties as soon 
as Marines set boots on the ground.
83
 The province was, according to 
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an Embassy/MNF-I National Coordination Team assessment, ground 
zero for the insurgency.  
 
Map 1: Iraq Provincial Stability, March 2006 
 
Map 1 illustrates that in 2005 Anbar was the most perilous 
Iraqi province in terms of level of violence and instability. In no place 
was Sunni disaffection greater. It was within this context that AQI 
sought to exploit the situation and take charge of the insurgency. 
 
B. Assessing the Insurgency 
For II MEF, gaining an understanding of insurgency was the 
first order of business. The word from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
well into 2004 was that this faceless enemy was made up of just 
“pockets of dead-enders,” only “small elements of 10 to 20 people, not 
large military formations or networks of attackers.”
84
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It did not look that way to II MEF. By 2005 the insurgency was 
quite robust, comprised of the elements described above. It was at this 
point that Al Qaeda made a power play to take it over and bend the 
insurgency to its will. Recall that in 2004, the constituent elements of 
the insurgency had formed into an alliance of convenience that had 
different objectives.  
From within the Sunni social order, Anbar sheikhs, imams, and 
former Ba’athist military and civilian officials backed or joined 
nationalist resistance groups. They did so to fight the American 
occupation and to prevent what they believed was an impending Shia 
onslaught. Aligning with them were international Salafi jihadists (and 
their homegrown counterparts) who had designated Iraq as the central 
front, the forward edge of the global battle in which to engage the 
United States. They believed that by forcing the Americans to give up 
the fight in Iraq, they could inflict a defeat of enormous consequences 
on it. After doing so, they intended to establish a Salafi social order 
there. 
This was an alliance of convenience and not a natural 
partnership. It was within this context that AQI sought to take control 
of the insurgency in 2005. Its goals were different from those of the 
Sunni nationalists. In 2003–2004, the latter had aligned with AQI and 
facilitated the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, giving them safe haven 
in Anbar. In 2005, that partnership ended. AQI wanted control, not 
collaboration, and it intended to take it by marginalizing the sheikhs 
who backed the national resistance groups. They were part of the old 
Iraq, not of the new religious order AQI intended to establish.  
This sounded like the CPA decision to write the tribes and 
sheikhs out of its own vision of the “new Iraq.” But the draconian 
methods AQI intended to use to marginalize them were very different. 
At the time Anbari sheikhs, disenchanted with the ruthless methods and 
long-term intentions of their erstwhile partner, began to mount 
opposition, AQI moved to viciously cut it off with a campaign of 
murder and intimidation. 
Al Qaeda believed such a campaign would overpower the 
sheikhs and their tribesmen. What transpired instead was tribal 
pushback. Evidently, AQI either forgot about tribal norms or, more 




likely, thought it could simply steamroll over them. First in Al Qaim 
and then in Ramadi and elsewhere in Anbar, al Qaeda responded to 
resistance by killing respected tribal leaders. As a result, sheikhs began 
in early 2005 to approach the coalition forces and ask for help. But they 
were turned down. According to then Col. Joe Dunford, “In the spring 
of 2005, I met with dozens of sheikhs … They said they’d fight on our 
side, but refused to go through the government in Baghdad. In [early] 
2005, we weren’t willing to accept that deal.”
85
  
Cooperation with the tribes was still proscribed. The decision 
makers in Baghdad and Washington did not grasp the potential 
strategic opportunity that splits in the insurgent ranks might offer to the 
coalition. But by the fall, the Marine command in Anbar did. Those 
tribal militias that constituted the rank and file of the nationalist 
factions of the insurgency, as well as other tribal elements who were on 
the sidelines of the fight, could be directed by their sheikhs to fight al 
Qaeda.  
What if the sheikhs ordered their men to do so in partnership 
with the Marine and Army forces in the province? The II MEF 
leadership began to see this as a potential game changer in Anbar. 
 
C. II MEF’s 2005 Campaign Plan 
The campaign plan for II MEF consisted of five lines of 
operations to provide a framework for applying kinetic and non-kinetic 
actions aimed at gaining control of the ground in Anbar. The plan 
sought to separate the insurgents from the people, hold the ground, and 
then carry out those civil reconstruction activities that win 
counterinsurgency fights.  
The first—security—was to establish safety for the population, 
isolate the insurgents from the population, and provide civilian 
agencies with the secure space needed to carry out those activities that 
make victory attainable. Security was the “table setter.” It involved 
clearing and holding those cities that ran along the Euphrates River 
from Fallujah to Al Qaim. They were the most violent places in Iraq, 
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each with substantial enemy presence. Security was the starting point. 
Without it, the Marines could achieve little in Anbar.  
The second—building the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—was the 
force multiplier that would allow II MEF to hold those cities and the 
areas surrounding them. The Marines could clear, but only with ISF 
could they hold and secure.  
The next two—governance and economic development—
addressed those aforementioned activities that make victory attainable. 
Governance creates a context that allows elected officials to administer 
in an effective manner, to handle political grievances, and to provide 
basic services. Economic development establishes the infrastructure 
needed to support growth and provide the basics to achieve a decent 
quality of life.  
The final line of operations focused on information and 
communication. These serve as the basis for developing a narrative, 
which provides the driving logic for the overall campaign plan.  
It was a comprehensive approach. But its starting point was 
security. Without security, without that separation of the insurgents 
from the people, those civil reconstruction activities would never get 
off the ground. For II MEF, security involved clearing the Euphrates 
River valley of major insurgent enclaves. According to Maj. Gen. 
Stephen Johnson, Operation Sayeed was intended to do just that. 
Consisting of “11 named operations under the Sayeed umbrella … the 
purpose … was to drive al Qaeda from the western Euphrates River 
Valley, and to eliminate it as a place where they could operate freely.”
86
 
For the forces of II MEF, Operation Sayeed was all about the use of 
highly lethal force to find and eliminate the insurgents.  
 
D. Clear and Hold 
It did not take II MEF long to learn that it could clear 
insurgents out of one area after another but could not hold those areas 
once they were cleared. This was true in each of Anbar’s three AOs 
(operational areas)—Denver, Topeka, Raleigh—as depicted in Map 2. 
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Each AO had either a Marine regimental combat team (RCT) or Army 
brigade combat team (BCT) assigned to it. But in each AO, neither the 




منطقة عمليات دنفر 
AO TOPEKA
منطقة عمليات توبيكا AO RALEIGH




























Map 2: Anbar’s Operational Areas 
 
 
In AO Denver, RCT-2 sought to deny the insurgents the ability 
to operate with impunity against the routes connecting Husaybah, Al 
Qa’im, Rawah, Haditha, and Hit. Col. Stephen Davis, who commanded 
RCT-2, intended to sweep the insurgents out of those cities and destroy 
enemy networks and infrastructure. But AO Denver covered “30,000 
square miles,” noted Davis. To cover it, he had “less than 3,400 people 
in the entirety of the RCT.”
87
 The mission assigned RCT-2 was to “Go 
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out there and disrupt and interdict.”
88
 And as soon as his battalions hit 
the ground, they were involved in disruption and interdiction 
operations.  
But the results were always inconclusive. While initially a 
success—the insurgents were rousted from their nests—it was only a 
fleeting victory. They could remove a sanctuary, noted the commander 
of RCT-2, “for a certain amount of time.” But the insurgents would be 
back as soon as the Marines withdrew. RCT-2 did not have enough 
forces to establish a lasting presence. “The enemy will go where we are 
not, and that's just the hard facts of life,” said Davis.”
89
 
The 2005 campaign plan called for “full spectrum counter-
insurgency operations,” but as the year came to a close in AO Denver, 
that goal remained elusive. The same was true in AO Raleigh for RCT-
8, said Lt. Col. William Mullen, the regiment’s chief of operations. 
“We can go anywhere we want; we just can't stay there and maintain a 
presence because of the fairly large size of the AO.”
90
 Throughout its 
deployment, RCT-8 executed numerous large sweeps to drive the 
insurgents out of their redoubts. But as in AO Denver, the enemy 
would return as soon as they departed.  
The insurgent center of gravity in Anbar was AO Topeka. And 
within the AO, Ramadi was ground zero. The city and its environs were 
an AQI stronghold. U.S. intelligence believed Zarqawi had his 
headquarters north of the city. An Army BCT attached to II MEF had 
responsibility for AO Topeka. In 2005 that was 2-2 BCT, which was 
replaced by the 2-28 BCT in August. 
Neither brigade had the capacity to clear, let alone hold, 
Ramadi. Just to maintain a presence, 2-2 assigned three battalions. 
Ramadi and its outskirts were geographically daunting because this 
area spread along the Euphrates River for nearly 40 kilometers. Ramadi 
was just too large to sweep and hold for 2-2 BCT. Its units were largely 
restricted to a handful of bases, which gave the insurgents plenty of 
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space to hide among Ramadi’s 500,000 residents. This included the 
Government Center, which had been riddled with bullet holes from 
countless firefights between coalition forces and insurgents. To 
resupply it, the Marine battalion assigned to 2-2 had to fight their way 
in and out. They were magnets for unrelenting insurgent fire. 
By the summer of 2005, it was clear to II MEF’s leadership 
that they were ensnared in a protracted irregular fight with an enemy 
they had no way of subduing. They did not have the necessary forces to 
clear and hold Anbar’s three AOs. They were in an endless game of 
Whac-a-Mole. The way out of it, they thought, was to build up Iraqi 
security forces in the province. 
 
E. No ISF Solution  
In 2005, the 1st and 7th Iraqi Army (IA) Divisions were 
assigned to II MEF. The IA forces, along with local police, were seen 
as the keys to establishing stability and control. But that goal, II MEF 
was to learn, was out of reach in Anbar. The reasons for this had to do 
with the composition of the 1st and 7th Divisions. They were 
undermanned and largely comprised of Shiites, with some Kurds. That 
made them persona non grata in the Sunni Triangle. The notion that 
battalions comprised of non-Sunnis were going to live amongst the 
people of Anbar and provide them with security was a non-starter in 
2005.  
Establishing local police forces in Anbar in 2005 proved even 
more challenging. In November of 2004, all the police in the province 
had been fired because of corruption, incompetence, or connections 
with elements of the insurgency. Consequently, Maj. David Barnes, the 
officer in charge of the Police Partnership Program, and his unit started 
from scratch. 
By the end of 2005, they had had some success in Fallujah, 
which was under the control of RCT-8 forces. Having established a 
process for selection, the Police Partnership Program eventually was 
able to train and certify 1,200 police officers for Fallujah. It took most 
of the year to accomplish, but they were able to do so because Marines 
held the ground.  




Elsewhere in Anbar the results were very poor, especially in 
Ramadi and cities west of it. As a result, the Police Partnership 
Program could not come even close to recruiting the number of men 
needed in Anbar. It was another setback for II MEF. 
 
F. Opportunity  
In the spring and summer of 2005, signs began to surface 
indicating that the insurgent alliance in Anbar was fragmenting. 
Sheikhs were starting to oppose AQI. The collaboration among the 
insurgent factions that existed in 2004 was beginning to come apart. 
Blunders by Zarqawi and his foreign fighters were fostering a backlash, 
providing opportunities for the Marines of II MEF to exploit.  
This first presented itself in AO Denver, where the Albu Mahal 
tribe in Al Qa’im was at odds with AQI. Several factors contributed to 
this fissure. First was AQI’s demand for half of the tribe’s smuggling 
profits. That was too much. Business was business, but this was 
extortion. Likewise, the tribe rejected AQI’s goal of establishing a rigid 
Salafi-style social system similar to what had existed in Afghanistan 
under Taliban rule. The sheikhs had no desire to live under such a 
puritanical order. The way AQI fought was also unacceptable to them. 
Sure, they were killing Marines, but many Ablu Mahal died as well in 
the indiscriminate suicide attacks that Zarqawi’s fighters employed. 
When the sheikhs implored AQI to desist in these matters, they became 
targets themselves. 
These developments drove the Albu Mahal to RCT-2 and 
during the fall months, they began cooperating against AQI. The 
sheikhs formed an independent militia group called the Desert 
Protectors to patrol the Syrian border with Marines. Those local tribal 
fighters provided border security and acted as scouts for Marine forces. 
The stricture against such cooperation was no longer the modus 
operandi in AO Denver. 
It was an opportunity Washington had missed earlier. But in 
the fall of 2005, pragmatism was replacing ill-conceived restrictions 
laid down by the CPA in 2003. The tribes were no longer part of the 
past. And if the Desert Protectors did not want to deploy out of the Al 
Qa’im region because they would not be able to protect their tribal 




members, well, that was okay, too. There were plenty of AQI fighters 
coming across the border to keep them occupied.  
Al Qa’im was an important turning point, but it was not the 
only one. In Ramadi, AQI’s center of gravity, the Albu Fahd, one of the 
most important tribes of the Dulaymi confederation in AO Raleigh, was 
likewise changing sides. Then, groundbreaking meetings took place in 
November and December in Ramadi to explore the basis for 
engagement and partnership. Here were the origins of the tribal 
engagement dimension of the strategy that I MEF initiated in 2006. As 
will be elaborated below, that three-dimensional strategy of the “clear, 
hold, build” phases of counterinsurgency, tribal engagement to solidify 
local security, and counterterrorism operations to attack the insurgent’s 
secret underground network was the basis for Marine Corps success in 
Anbar. 
 
A key figure facilitating those initial engagement discussions 
was the governor of Anbar province, Mamoon Sami Rashid al-Alwani. 
In 2005, he began advocating for dialogue between the sheikhs and the 
II MEF. The first development that made this possible was his 
interaction with the 2nd Marine Division’s assistant division 
commander, Brig. Gen. James Williams. The two men developed a 
close working relationship. Next, Mamoon was able to enlist the 
support of prominent sheikhs. They saw engagement with the coalition 
as a way out from under AQI. One of those sheikhs was Albu Fahad 
leader Nasser al-Mukhlif, who became a key figure in the November-
December conferences hosted by Mamoon and Williams.  
Those meetings were the beginning of an engagement process 
that would culminate by the summer of 2007 in the strategic defeat of 
AQI in Anbar. The focus was on what kind of local security forces to 
establish in Anbar and what their relationship would be to the coalition. 
The key element in those initial discussions—the police—would come 
to serve as the foundation for holding the ground in the province in 
2006–2007. 
That II MEF embraced this opportunity was another critical 
learning juncture in 2005. As the year ended, Anbar was in the throes 
of a transition, although many in Washington were not aware of it or 




the implications it could have for AQI’s hold on the province. They 
viewed Anbar through the lens of escalating violence, and their 
perceptions were colored by the brutal fighting the Marines had 
engaged in during the year. But in the midst of that fight, II MEF found 
a way forward to be able to clear and hold in Anbar through 
engagement and partnership. The sheikhs that took part in the 
November-December talks brokered by Governor Mamoon had an 
alternative in mind—grassroots Sunni security forces drawn from the 
tribes of the Dulaymi confederation. This was an opportunity-in-




1. What role, if any, did the US military’s lack of understanding 
about the local culture and local dynamics play in the rise of 
the insurgency? 
2. How quickly and with what results did the USMC overcome 
these initial gaps? 
3. What were the key factors in overcoming these initial results? 
4. How can the information learned by current forces in the field 
be transferred early enough to the relief unit, prior to their 
deployment?  
5. At what level should this transfer take place? 
6. How can small unit-level innovations, learning, and adaptation 
be captured and disseminated to other units? 
7. To what extent are operational tempo and lack of resources 
barriers to learning? What are the other barriers? How did the 
USMC overcome these in Anbar?   






Organizations that successfully navigate the learning cycle 
capture the lessons from their operational experiences and embed them 
into the organization’s memory through various processes or routines. 
Routines guide behavior and can take the form of rules, procedures, and 
strategies around which organizations are constructed and through 
which they operate.  
In the case of the Marine Corps, those routines include a set of 
procedures wherein one operational unit, in this case a MEF, relieves 
another one. Those procedures entail mechanisms by which the 
replacement unit embraces and incorporates the experiences and 
knowledge gained from the deployment of the unit it is relieving. 
Through that interaction, it then adjusts its campaign plan in ways 
designed to correct gaps in the performance of its predecessor, in order 
to maximize success during its upcoming deployment. These 
procedures shaped the relief in place (RIP) process in which I MEF 
replaced II MEF in the early 2006.  
 
A. Surging Violence and Grim Prognoses 
As I MEF prepared to deploy back to Anbar for its second 
round, a SITREP for the province would have followed the 
conventional wisdom at the time: surging violence and grim prognoses. 
Enemy violence was skyrocketing, while almost every prediction for 
U.S. success in Anbar was spiraling downward.  
At the epicenter of this deteriorating state of affairs was 
Ramadi, Anbar’s capital. By 2006, it had assumed the moniker of “the 
most dangerous city in Iraq.” Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had taken charge 
of it. Having been driven from its Fallujah stronghold in late 2004 by 
Operation Al Fajr, AQI relocated to Ramadi. By 2006 it had taken over 
the city and declared it the capital of its new Islamic caliphate. The 
only ground MEF forces held there was the Government Center, and it 
was often under enemy attack.  
Ramadi was not the only place AQI redeployed. Five other 
major towns up the Euphrates corridor—Hit, Haditha, Anah, Rawah, 




and Al Qa’im—likewise had a robust AQI presence. Each “witnessed 
heavy clashes resulting in the death of hundreds of local citizens and 
the destruction of thousands of shops, schools, houses and government 
buildings.” At least that’s what the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs reported on IRIN, its humanitarian news service. 




Those who collect statistics added further confirmation of the 
gloomy state of affairs awaiting I MEF. January 2006 saw 
approximately 2,000 insurgent attacks across Iraq’s 18 provinces. By 
October, that number was well over 5,000.
92
 Anbar, one of those 18 
provinces, accounted for nearly 1,500 of those acts of violence. This 





B. AQI’s Targeted Killing 
When tribal sheikhs began negotiating with the MEF 
leadership in late 2005 and 2006, it greatly worried AQI, which saw 
this as a survival threat. If the police came to be filled with local 
tribesmen sent by their sheikhs, AQI operatives would no longer be 
able to “hide in plain sight.” The local population knew who they were, 
and if they started feeding that information to the police and U.S. 
military, AQI would find itself out of business in Ramadi.  
One of the most important sheikhs involved in those 2005 
deliberations was Nasser Abd al-Karim Mukhlif al-Fahdawi of the 
Albu Fahad tribe. In early 2006, he organized a majlis (meeting) with 
Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari and U.S. Ambassador Zalmay 
Khalilzad in Baghdad. Jafari was not keen on the idea of recruiting 
Sunni tribesmen into local police forces that Baghdad did not control. 
But Khalilzad had a different view of Sunni tribal engagement: it was 
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an opportunity, if managed properly. He convinced Jafari to agree they 
could be recruited to help I MEF drive al Qaeda out of Anbar. Nasser 
said the sheikhs would provide the recruits. 
The very next day, Sheikh Nasser and his brother were gunned 
down. This was the start of a fierce counterattack to stop tribal 
engagement. Within weeks, several other sheikhs were assassinated. Al 
Qaeda intended to use terror to keep an iron grip on the province. The 
violence unleashed by Zarqawi was ferocious. Consequently, 
cooperation between the sheikhs and I MEF declined precipitously. 
Terror was working. It was going to take a proactive engagement effort 
by I MEF to break AQI’s vise grip. But as we shall see, that 
engagement course of action was not a standalone undertaking, as some 
analysts have argued.
94 
Rather, it was an integral part of a three-
dimensional strategy that consisted of the counterinsurgency phases of 
“clear, hold, build,” tribal engagement to expand the operating force 
available to the MEFs to ensure local security, and targeted 
counterterrorism aimed at degrading al Qaeda’s clandestine apparatus. 
 
C. I MEF’s Operational Plan 
Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, the I MEF commander, intended to 
take a “different approach to the counterinsurgency fight in Anbar.”
95
 
What that meant, said his deputy, Brig. Gen. Robert Neller, was 
focusing on population control and population security: “This fight is 
for population control, and we want to have control so that we can 
provide security for the population … [We intended to] keep the 
insurgents out, keep the good people in, and be able to provide them 
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with a secure environment so that they're confident in the security 
forces, and [will] tell us when the bad guys move in on them.”
96
 
I MEF built its campaign plan around “clear, hold, build.” And 
it intended to implement it methodically, using the oil spot approach, 
one of those classic COIN tenets from the 1950s and 1960s. In this 
approach, the counterinsurgent forces concentrate on a specific area, 
take control of it, secure the population, and then expand that secured 
zone outward. It is not a complicated concept, but its implementation is 
another matter. How I MEF intended to do so was spelled out in its 
operational plan (OPLAN) for 2006.
97
 And that plan drew heavily on 
what I MEF had learned from II MEF’s experiences. 
A key element in the OPLAN called for I MEF to expand 
Anbar’s police. The goal, recalled Zilmer, was “to make as many police 
as we could possibly make, to train them properly … and to increase 
the size and the capability of the Iraqi Army.”
98
 He believed that a key 
driver for counterinsurgency success would come through expansion of 
the local police.  
As noted earlier, II MEF had tried this in 2005, but was only 
able to recruit a handful of men. Recruiting Anbari citizens into the 
ranks of local police had been an exercise in futility. Zilmer, Neller, 
and their planning staff knew they had to make adjustments.  
One of those adjustments assumed that to successfully recruit 
local police, it was necessary to clear and hold the area they were 
expected to supervise. Once done, those local police could then be 
protected from major insurgent counterattacks. This provided them 
with the security they need to carry out local policing. I MEF’s 
planning staff understood the logic of this basic COIN sequence. They 
had to demonstrate that they would not leave the local police out there 
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on their own, an important commitment the sheikhs had to have faith 
in. 
To make that point, I MEF picked Anbar’s most dangerous 
city—Ramadi—-as the place to lay down its marker. Zilmer tasked his 
planning team to “put together a … very detailed plan to secure the 
provincial capital.” That design called for securing parts of the city 
before seeking to engage the sheikhs and their tribesmen in the COIN 
process. According to one of the planning officers, this was because the 




Zilmer’s planning team surveyed the city with overhead 
imagery to determine where to put each check point, each police station 
and, most importantly, each combat outpost (COP) that would station I 
MEF forces in Ramadi on a 24/7 basis. That is how they would start to 
secure the ground in the city and from there spread outward. “We had a 
… very methodical plan,” summed up the planning officer, “to build oil 
spot zones of security and build out from there.”
100
 
This was the starting point, and it had to precede tribal 
engagement. Take the ground, and demonstrate to the sheikhs that you 
intended to stay on it. That was the signal they were looking for. The 
sheikhs would work against AQI, as some of them had already 
demonstrated. But they needed to believe I MEF would secure their 
flanks and cover their backs. According to Neller: “There is much talk 
about ‘clear, hold, and build’ as a methodology for COIN operations. 
You cannot perform these tasks if you don’t stay in an area and 




This was the foundation of the OPLAN that I MEF’s planning 
staff devised in early 2006: to establish and maintain presence among 
the people of Anbar, be they in Ramadi, or in other cities and towns 
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running along the Euphrates up to Al Qa’im. Do that and the door to 
tribal engagement with the sheikhs will open. 
And if those sheikhs gave the signal, men from their tribal 
militias could easily fill the ranks of the local police. Reviving the 
police required “a strong buy-in from the tribal sheikhs,” explained 
Zilmer. “The most important social custom … for the Anbar people is 
that tribal-sheikh relationship. … We had to learn that.”
102
  
Effectively engaging the sheikhs also meant learning, 
accepting, and, as much as possible, embracing the code of values and 
beliefs that guide their behavior and the ways they do things. “We 
recognized that dealing in a counterinsurgency in the Middle East or in 
the Arab world requires a fundamental understanding of their culture 
… We spent a lot of effort to get our Marines sensitive to that,” said 
Gen. Zilmer. There is “a certain style and methodology that is unique to 
their culture, and we ignore that at our own peril, and we set ourselves 
up for frustration.” I MEF had to get the fact that they were “walking 




All of that made sense—in theory. But carrying out tribal 
engagement on the ground in Anbar tested the extent to which I MEF 
could adapt. Consider the experience of Lt. Col. Scott Shuster, the CO 
of Marine Combat Battalion 3/4 in AO Denver.  
In discussing how tribal engagement necessitated becoming 
“comfortable with cultural norms,” the battalion commander pulled out 
a photograph of himself “walking down the street [in Al Qa’im] 
holding hands with the mayor. Here in Iraq,” he said, “in this culture, 
walking hand in hand down the street says we are friends, we trust each 
other, I will do things for him, he will do things for me, this is my 
brother. It is a sign of respect and it is a sign of acceptance.” Now that’s 
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D. Topeka, Denver, Raleigh 
In each of Anbar’s areas of operations—Topeka, Denver, 
Raleigh—I MEF’s campaign plan was put into practice in 2006. The 
results are briefly highlighted below. 
In 2006 AO Topeka was assigned to the 1st Brigade Combat 
Team, 1st Armored Division—the “Ready First”—commanded by Col. 
Sean MacFarland. The unit deployed to Anbar in May from Tal Afar. 
That earlier deployment was important for the Ready First. In Tal Afar, 
it was introduced to the counterinsurgency operations successfully 
executed in 2005 by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment commanded 
by Col. H. R. McMaster. However, in Ramadi the Ready First was not 
falling in behind a COIN operation that was well underway.  
Ramadi was very different. “It was a pretty dire situation,” 
recalled MacFarland. “Ramadi was essentially under enemy control.” 
AQI “had freedom of movement throughout most of the city … If we 
tried to get close to the center of the city … we would come into heavy 
contact … al Qaeda dominated the city … Zarqawi was known to be 
out there.” And he had plenty of fighters with him.
 105 
Upon arriving in the AO, Col. MacFarland was told by I 
MEF’s Gen. Zilmer to “fix Ramadi but don’t do a Fallujah.”
106
 That 
meant taking a COIN approach. MacFarland was ready for that, having 
conducted COIN up in Tal Afar. And Zilmer had embedded COIN in 
his OPLAN for the theater. It was just the right confluence of thinking 
and planning, recalled MacFarland.
107
 He intended to use Ready First 
units to clear and hold Ramadi. And Zilmer assigned Marine Battalion 
1/6 to give MacFarland extra boots on the ground. 
Step one was the “isolation of the city.” The days of AQI 
moving in and out at will had to end. Next, MacFarland intended to 
establish combat outposts in Ramadi “to take the city and its environs 
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back [from AQI] one neighborhood at a time.” And once a COP owned 
a piece of ground in the capital, they would engage the local sheikhs, 
convincing them “we intend to stay.” And then they would encourage 
the sheikhs to partner up and send their tribesmen to join the local 
police force in “the secured neighborhood.”
108
 Here we see the 
symbiotic relationship between the counterinsurgency phases of “clear 
and hold” and tribal engagement’s role in expanding the available 
operating forces to ensure local security continuity.  
This was the beginning. It set in motion the spreading of the oil 
spot across Ramadi. In neighborhood after neighborhood, the soldiers 
and Marines under MacFarland’s command took control. And because 
AQI could not be sure where the next COP would spring up, said the 
colonel, “We found out pretty quickly that we were able to get in and 
set up … overnight and the enemy usually took about 48 hours to 
respond.” The brigade “had to dedicate a fair amount of combat power 
to securing each COP and protecting the lines of communications 
[LOC]” between the COPs because “we knew AQI would try to come 
back in behind us and reseed our LOCs with IEDs.”
109
  
In effect, MacFarland’s men were beginning to network 
Ramadi with combat outposts that established “mutually supporting 
and interlocking fields of fire and observation along those LOCs [that 
linked them together]. That was … the process.”
110
 And playing a key 
role in that campaign in central Ramadi—ground zero in the fight to 
oust al Qaeda—was the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, under the command 
of Lt. Col. William Jurney.  
This was the sign the sheikhs wanted to see. But combat 
outposts were only one side of COIN. The other side was to establish 
Iraqi police substations at or near the COPs. To do this, Iraqi police 
were needed, and in large numbers. To fill those police ranks, the 
sheikhs began sending their tribesmen to help spread the oil spot.  
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As these developments unfolded during the fall months of 
2006, al Qaeda understood what they signaled for the fate of its 
caliphate. It escalated the violence, increasing the number of daily 
attacks. But the combination of tribal engagement and combat outposts 
proved toxic to AQI’s efforts to dominate Ramadi.”
111
 The soldiers and 
Marines under Col. MacFarland’s command were taking hold of 
Ramadi, with the help of rapidly growing numbers of police. They had 
initiated a process that their replacements in 2007 would complete. 
In AO Denver, RCT-7 arrived on the heels of Operation Steel 
Curtain, a successful 2,000 Marine sweep to dislodge insurgents from 
Hit, Haditha, Hussaybah, and Al Qa’im. Col. William Crowe planned 
to build on Steel Curtain by “spreading that oil spot.”
112
 Specifically, he 
intended to take RCT-2’s success in holding Al Qa’im and emulate it. 
Having swept AQI out, RCT-2 left “one American battalion” in place 
to hold. That told the sheikhs they could count on RCT-2. Crowe 
intended to reinforce that message throughout the AO. 
Having a lock on Al Qa’im, the RCT-7 chief applied the same 
approach to the towns along the Euphrates corridor, including Rawah, 
Anah, Haditha, Baghdadi, and Hit. For each, it was the same COIN 
method implemented in town after town down to the Ramadi outskirts. 
That is what Col. Crowe meant by “spreading that oil spot.” 
Finally, responsibility for AO Raleigh in the spring of 2006 
was assigned to RCT-5, commanded by Col. Lawrence Nicholson. The 
model that he seized upon for the AO was the successful COIN 
program in Fallujah. It was an outstanding illustration of “clear, hold, 
build.” Col. Nicholson explained: “We’ve had significant success in the 
Fallujah AO … When we took over from RCT-8 the seeds were 
already there … we inherited a better situation. We had more [local] 
security forces in this part of Al Anbar.” The city had a robust Iraqi 
police force, and they helped make Fallujah, in the colonel’s 
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estimation, “without peer in terms of security” in any of Iraq’s cities.
113
 
And that security and stability, empowered by engagement, opened the 
door for political progress and economic recovery. Fallujah had a 
functioning city council and thorough engagement efforts were under 
way to rebuild infrastructure and jumpstart business. 
Nicholson thought that if it worked in Fallujah, spread it 
elsewhere in AO Raleigh to provide stability and security to the rest of 
the population. It was basic counterinsurgency principles. “You must 
go back to the people. You must engage the people. ... Look,” he 




Key to RCT-5’s success was the growth of the Iraqi security 
forces. “We have almost doubled our battle space in terms of 
geography … We now go all the way to damn near to Ramadi,” said 
Col. Nicholson in March 2007. “We’ve been able to do that because 
we’ve turned over a lot of existing battle space to Iraqis … I have three 
Iraqi brigades, all of which are now independent brigades … I’m 
incredibly pleased with our Iraqi police work … I don’t know of 
anybody who has had the kind of success we have had with the 
police.”
115
 As a result of these developments, RCT-5’s mission was 
evolving by the end of its deployment, with non-kinetic activities on 
the increase. 
 
E. The Awakening: A Force Multiplier 
These developments in Denver, Topeka, and Raleigh could not 
have taken place without tribal engagement. The sheikhs had to send 
men to the police for I MEF to gain the manpower needed to “hold” the 
ground across Anbar.  
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But getting them to do so in the aftermath of AQI’s ferocious 
murder and intimidation campaign was not easy. That is why I MEF’s 
plan called for RCT-7, RCT-5, and the Ready First to demonstrate that 
they would not leave once they cleared an area, which was an important 
assurance that the sheikhs had to trust in. As was noted earlier, the 
counterinsurgency phases of “clear, hold, build” were symbiotically 
interrelated with tribal engagement in Anbar, and they were 
implemented in conjunction with one another. 
Well aware of the consequences of the sheikhs aligning against 
it, al Qaeda gave no quarter into the summer months. Then it went too 
far in August when it murdered Sheikh Abu Ali Jassim, who had been 
encouraging members of his tribesmen to join the police and resist 
AQI. After killing him, his assassins hid the sheikh’s body rather than 
returning it for a proper burial. This violated Islamic law and inflamed 
not only Sheikh Jassim’s fellow tribesmen, but many other sheiks from 
across Al Anbar.  
In conjunction with the signals being sent through the 
operations of RCT-7, RCT-5, and the Ready First a critical turning 
point had been reached. The situation was ripe for engagement, a fact 
that several sheikhs came to embrace, most importantly Sheikh Abdul 
Sittar albu-Risha. His father had been murdered by AQI, as were two of 
his brothers, all for opposing AQI’s imposition of its interpretation of 
Sharia law.  
Sheikh Ahmed, Sittar’s brother and the paramount sheikh of 
the Albu Risha tribe, recalled in a 2009 interview how those days 
unfolded: “We realized that the people had had it with the [al Qaeda] 
situation … So Sheik Sittar and I, we … got in touch with the tribal 
sheikhs and their cousins … to fight al-Qaeda.” Sittar told his brother, 
“Leave it to me. I’ll take care of it.” And he began “talking with the 
tribal sheiks, one by one … He gathered them for a conference on the 
14th of September, 2006.”
116
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At that meeting, an important segment of Anbar’s leading tribal 
sheiks agreed to align with I MEF to fight AQI. The main room of 
Sattar’s house, recalled Col. MacFarland, was filled with sheikhs and 
“all kinds of other guys lining the walls.” Sheikh Sittar came to the 
doorway to greet the brigade commander and brought him “up to sit 
down with him at the head chair at the head of the room … to explain 
that they wanted to form this Awakening movement.”
117
 
The central importance of tribal engagement in 
counterinsurgency operations was well understood by Gen. Zilmer and 
the I MEF staff. They embedded it in their operational plan for Anbar. 
So, when Sittar and over 50 leading sheikhs and other important 
political figures met on September 14 to get the Anbar Awakening 
Council off the ground, I MEF was leaning forward to work with them. 
It was in the OPLAN, which had been structured to facilitate 
engagement by staying in place. All the pieces were coming together 
for a reversal of fortune in Anbar. 
 
F. The Tipping Point 
By December, the situation across Anbar was tipping in favor 
of I MEF and against AQI. If II MEF had learned in 2005, I MEF 
utilized those lessons to adapt in 2006. Its COIN-based operational plan 
with the interrelated elements of clearing out insurgents, holding 
territory through combat outposts, engaging and aligning with the 
sheikhs, and building local Iraqi police units drawn from those tribes 
had shifted the ground in Anbar. And when fused with what Ali Hatim 
Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman, the paramount sheikh of the Dulaym 
confederation, called “the Awakening Revolution,” the conditions were 




Several accounts have characterized the Sunni Awakening as a 
sudden “flipping” of the sheikhs from one side to the other, and a 
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standalone process. But what this study found was just the opposite. 
The Awakening was a process that began at the end of 2005 and in 
2006 passed through two phases. The first was the ill-fated effort in the 
early winter months that was snuffed out by AQI. The second came in 
the summer. It took root because of the successful execution of I 
MEF’s operational plan, in particular the linking of tribal engagement 
with the methodical establishment of combat outposts in the population 
centers of Anbar. In Topeka, Raleigh, and Denver the forces of I MEF 
spread the oil spot, securing more and more ground. 
The events of 2006 reveal that holding territory is essential in 
this kind of war. It is the foundation for a successful counterinsurgency 
strategy. You must be able to secure the ground where the population 
lives. I MEF’s COIN-based operational plan cleared the insurgents out 
of the populated areas and then secured that territory through combat 
outposts. In doing this, it demonstrated to the people of Anbar that 
engagement was for real.  
Territory is as important in counterinsurgency as it is in 
conventional operations, but for different reasons. In COIN, taking 
territory constrains the enemy’s freedom of movement and gives the 
population a safe space to live and work. Once the sheikhs were 
convinced that I MEF intended to stay the course in Anbar, they opened 
the door to the support of the population. And that population, in turn, 
swelled the ranks of the Anbar security forces and delivered a wealth of 
local intelligence on the whereabouts of the AQI network in the 
province. 
Finally, 2006 demonstrated that the tipping point in 
counterinsurgency is not always self-evident. The year had been an 
increasingly violent one in Anbar, as the statistics demonstrate. 
Understanding what that escalating violence signaled proved extremely 
tricky. Some assessments declaring Anbar lost were far off the mark. In 
2007, II MEF replaced I MEF. They saw the situation quite differently. 
It offered opportunity, and they intended to capitalize on the tipping 
point that had been reached in 2006. II MEF planned to “cash in,” 
consolidating the gains made by I MEF. 
 
 






1. What effect does a stable, settled population have on 
developing COIN oil spots? 
2. What are the barriers to developing a “permanent force” in an 
area with a strong history of invasion and conflict? What are 
the risks and rewards of this strategy? 
3. Can “clear, hold, build” work in already unstable regions? If 
so, how? What adaptations are needed, and what are the risks 
and rewards?  
4. This case study presents the USMC perspective on a bigger 
story, which leads to a larger set of questions. The most 
controversial of these is: What explains the success in Anbar? 
Some of the issues that should be discussed include: 
5. Was the tipping point in Anbar initiated by the tribal 
Awakening Movement, the Marines, or something else?  
6. What was the role of Task Force 145 (see Section VI) and their 
targeted killing of al-Qaeda operatives in Anbar?  
7. What was the role of individuals in taking advantage of 
changing dynamics? Was there a single tipping point, or did 
several events set the conditions for success? 
8. What does this discussion on success teach us about other 
insurgencies?  
9. As outsiders in a culture, can we recognize and exploit the 
tipping point before the insurgency does? If not, how can we 
use local knowledge to improve our chances of success? 
  






In late 2006, II MEF prepared to return to an Anbar province 
that was in the throes of change. Its leadership understood the gains I 
MEF had made in 2006, and they intended to piggyback on their 
strategy to exploit those gains and reach the crossover point, the 
transition from the kinetic fight to the post-conflict phase of 
counterinsurgency. But it was hard to plan for when to do this and how 
long it would take. 
 Maj. Gen. Walt Gaskin, the commanding general of II MEF 
(Forward), did not have his command prepare a new campaign plan for 
2007. I MEF “had [established] a tremendous foundation” to build on, 
he explained. “I took his [Gen. Zilmer’s] campaign plan and I 
developed it.”
119
 This included “the tribal engagement part.” That was 
essential if II MEF was going to “in a COIN sense—counterinsurgency 
sense—separate Al Qaida … from the population centers.”
120
  
Tribal engagement was the key for building on what I MEF had 
accomplished. Consequently, that necessitated a keen understanding of 
the tribes of Anbar. In II MEF’s “workup” for Anbar, then-Brig. Gen. 
John Allen was tasked by Gen. Gaskin with “putting together a PME 
[professional military education] program on tribal engagement, the 
history of Mesopotamia and Iraq into modern times and, in particular, 
about what we termed the human terrain in Anbar Province.”
121
  
As part of this organizational learning, II MEF brought to 
Camp Lejeune numerous specialists on these matters with much 
experience on the ground in the Arab world and with tribal societies. 
All of this was geared to prepare Marines to be able to work “inside the 
tribes,” to “penetrate the tribal membrane,” said Allen.
122
 And that was 
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true not only for officers at the rank of Generals Gaskin and Allen, but 
also for those junior officers and NCOs of the MEF’s companies and 
platoons. In fact, it was especially critical for the latter because 
counterinsurgency fights are won or lost by those small units. All of 
them, said General Allen, had to have an “understanding of tribalism, 
understanding of the personalities that we were going to face and the 
whole dynamic of the code of conduct associated with being a member 
of an Arab tribe … [if] we were going to fully grasp the opportunities 
in front of us.”
123
 Tribal engagement had to be facilitated and nurtured. 
Tribal engagement was not a “happening,” but a methodical process 
that required careful tending to bring to fruition.  
 
A. Line of Attack 
II MEFs lines of operations were subdivided between its 
Ground Force Element (GFE) and Combat Service Support Element 
(CSSE). The former was commanded by Brig. Gen. Mark Gurganus, 
while Brig. Gen. Allen was assigned responsibility for the latter. 
Gurganus had responsibility for the kinetic fight. To execute it, 
he deployed two Marine regiments to AO Denver and Raleigh and an 
Army brigade to AO Topeka. With those forces, he intended to 
establish security and stability from one end of Anbar to the other. He 
also had responsibility for training the Iraqi security forces, expanding 
their ranks to be able hold the ground once it was cleared of insurgents. 
As commander of the Combat Service Support Element, Gen. Allen 
had responsibility for an array of non-kinetic missions that included 
governance, economic development and rule of law. 
Moreover, Allen had responsibility for “tribal engagement,” 
which he described as “the critical enabler within and around all the 
Lines of Operation.”
124
 Neither Gurganus nor Allen could successfully 
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prosecute their lines of operations without it. Tribal engagement was 
the key to everything II MEF hoped to achieve in 2007.
 125
  
While II MEF did plan and execute across these kinetic and 
non-kinetic lines of operations, and while it is the case that they were in 
mutual support of each other, they did have to be implemented 
sequentially. For the non-kinetic lines of operations to have the desired 
effect, it was first necessary to use firepower and maneuvers to attack 
enemy strongholds, drive them out, and then hold that ground after it 
was cleared. This was the kinetic part of counterinsurgency operations, 
and it established the security that set the table for the non-kinetic 
LOOs. This was the line of attack taken by II MEF in 2007. 
 
B. Consolidating Security in Topeka, Raleigh, and Denver 
When II MEF deployed to Anbar, plenty of violence awaited it. 
The weekly average number of attacks for the province in January was 
400.
126
 Each of Anbar’s AO’s still teemed with AQI fighters, and Gen. 
Gurganus, in conjunction with his three battlespace regimental and 
brigade commanders, focused on driving them out and then securing 
that ground. What follows is a brief recounting of those operations.  
 
AO Topeka: Ramadi 
When Col. John Charlton took the 1st Brigade Combat Team 
(BCT) of the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division to AO Topeka in February 
2007, he knew the numbers. The BCT he was replacing had been there 
“eight months and lost 80 Soldiers and Marines,” he recalled. “We 
were going to be there for at least a year and we found out later that it 
was going to extend to 15 months. So, I knew that there was no way we 
could sustain that [casualty rate] … we had to do something dramatic 
… otherwise we would die from 1,000 cuts.”
127
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The colonel decided to clear AQI out of Ramadi en masse and 
take control of the city. The Ready First had made a “penetration, they 
had established a foothold” in Ramadi, noted Charlton. “The next 
logical step was to pour everything in there because we had the 
conditions set to do that. We had a nascent relationship now with the 
tribal leaders and that led to their greater support for the ISF. So, from a 
tactical standpoint, we were postured well.”
128
  
Col. Charlton planned a six-week campaign consisting of 
several operations to take hold of different parts of Ramadi. The first of 
these took place in the southeastern part of the city, known locally as 
the Ma’laab District. The techniques used here were repeated in 
subsequent operations. They mirrored, said the colonel, “the “clear, 
hold, build paradigm … You have to do a physical separation of the 
population from the enemy and you do that through clearing … going 
house to house, street by street, and clearing the enemy out.”
129
 
Having cleared, it was time to hold the Ma’laab, to secure that 
separation of the population from AQI. To do so, Charlton’s men 
started establishing COPs. The first combat outpost was set up in 48 
hours. He described the process as a “COP in a box, a pre-fabricated 
fighting position made out of steel and ballistic glass. We had trucks 
that were all packaged with these things and once we seized a building, 
we could have a fully functional combat outpost within about 48 hours. 
We had engineers standing by to go in there and establish power and 
wire the place up so you had lights and generators and radios.”
130
  
And once the COP had secured the area, its forces began 
interacting with the local population to gain their support. They did so 
by providing humanitarian assistance, including blankets, generators, 
food and potable water, and medical support. They even distributed 
damage payments to begin the rebuilding process. The end result was 
that in three weeks the operation eliminated insurgent safe havens, 
established security in the Ma’laab, empowered the Iraqi Police and 
local government legitimacy, and established public works projects. 











The 1st BCT repeated this elsewhere in Ramadi with the same 
results. By March 30, the city was cleared. On that day Charlton 
surveyed it from end to end and found it “quiet.” It was, he exclaimed, 
“unbelievable … There was not one single attack in my entire AO, to 
include downtown Ramadi.”
131
 AQI had lost Ramadi in just six weeks. 
Charlton’s men established 40 platoon- and company-sized joint 
security stations, combat outposts, and checkpoints throughout the city. 





AO Raleigh: Fallujah 
The situation in AO Raleigh when RCT-7 commander Col. 
Richard Simcock arrived was slipping backward, however. His mission 
was to tackle the dogged insurgent attacks taking place in his AO, 
starting with parts of Fallujah. Simcock intended to employ the same 
tactics being used in Ramadi by Lt. Col. Bill Jurney, whose Marine 
battalion was sweeping insurgents out of the city one block at a time, 
establishing the conditions for “COPs in a box.” 
In Fallujah, Simcock’s 2/6 battalion did the same thing. By the 
end of the spring, neighborhoods that 2/6 Marines had been unable to 
enter without getting into a gunfight in the winter months were now 
quiet. Other parts of AO Raleigh also had some real hot spots that the 
battalions of RCT-7 had to pacify. They followed the same blueprint, 
connecting the clear-hold-build dots. In other words, where AQI once 
roamed freely and with impunity, the Marines forces established a 
permanent and persistent presence there. And once the local population 
felt secure, they established a neighborhood watch and the tips on AQI 
whereabouts rolled in.  
By June major kinetic operations were over in AO Raleigh, 
said the executive officer (XO) of RCT-7. They were “largely done.” 
The mission was now to transfer control to Iraqi security forces, 
training their police and army to assume control. And that took time, he 
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 But RCT-7 could only get to that point by clearing, holding, 
and establishing permanent presence. It was a point that Col. Simcock 
underscored. Through “permanent presence the people know that 
you’re there to stay, you build those relationships, they start talking to 





Finally, in AO Denver, RCT-2 initiated a series of operations 
to consolidate the security gains made there in 2006 to move into the 
non-kinetic stages of counterinsurgency. By the fall of 2007 these 
security consolidating operations, particularly in the Al Qa’im area, 
made possible the handoff of multiple RCT-2 fixed positions to ISF, 
increasing ISF’s responsibility and visibility with the populace.  
 
C. Counterterrorism Operations 
Implementing counterinsurgency was II MEF’s main effort in 
Anbar. As illustrated above, this entailed taking control of the ground 
in the province by spreading that COIN oil spot, and then consolidating 
those gains through tribal engagement. But there was a natural 
complement to those counterinsurgency and tribal engagement 
operations, the counterterrorist program carried out by the special 
mission units of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). 
While COIN and tribal engagement isolated the population 
from AQI and established local protection and security, they did not 
eliminate AQI’s secret apparatus. Those surreptitious capabilities 
provided AQI with a broad assortment of means to conduct irregular 
warfare in Anbar and elsewhere in Iraq. That highly clandestine 
network, which was composed of a complex array of operational, 
command, and support units, was generally beyond the reach of MEF 
forces and their tribal counterparts.
135
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To disrupt and degrade AQI’s secret infrastructure in Anbar, 
the U.S. employed a clandestine organization—Task Force 145—that 
likewise operated in the shadows and consisted of highly trained 
special mission units. Their forte was offensive and highly lethal 
counterterrorism measures directly targeted at the enemy’s clandestine 
apparatus. This was the third dimension of strategy implemented by the 
Marines in Anbar beginning in 2006. 
In Iraq, that high-speed outfit was put together by Lt. Gen. Stan 
McChrystal, who had spent a good part of his Army career in the 
special mission units of JSOC. He commanded JSOC and deployed 
with units to Iraq from September 2003 until June 2008. Once there, he 
built a special task force made up of the Army’s Delta Force, Navy 
SEAL Team 6, the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation 
Regiment, elements of the the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 24th 
Special Tactics Squadron of the Air Force. Additionally, men from the 
Britain Special Air Service (SAS) were part of this team, which came 
to be known as Task Force 145. 
In Iraq, Task Force 145 was located at Balad, a Saddam-era 
airbase 68 kilometers north of Baghdad. McChrystal had it up and 
running by June 2004. In putting it together, McChrystal started with 
the premise that he needed a networked organization to defeat the al 
Qaeda network in Iraq. This was because terrorist groups like AQ had 
shifted from formally organized hierarchical systems to flexible, 
decentralized network structures of loosely connected individuals and 
subgroups that operated with considerable tactical independence. The 
Balad facility included a state-of-the-art joint operations center (JOC), 
whose daily activities were directed by the commander of Delta Force. 
Task Force 145 was subdivided into geographically targeted units: Task 
Force West was assigned to the greater Anbar area; the Baghdad area 
was assigned to Task Force Central; Task Force North focused on the 
Kurdish region; the SAS men of Task Force Black were in the south of 
Iraq.  
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Task Force 145’s operational tempo, set by McChrystal, was to 
“hit them every night.” And that resulted in the elimination of a large 
number of AQI’s mid-level managers who ran the operational, 
command, and support units. How many did they remove? In the covert 
world of outfits like Task Force 145, such numbers are hard to come 
by. But in his book Task Force Black, the story of the British SAS 
element assigned to McChrystal, the well-connected journalist Mark 
Urban provides some startling figures. If he is to be believed, 145 
became an AQI killing machine. “Between 2005 and early 2007,” he 
reports, Task Force 145 “killed two thousand members of the Sunni 




D. Expanding ISF 
In addition to the kinetic fight against the insurgents, Gen. 
Gurganus had responsibility for training the Iraqi security forces. 
Expanding their ranks was essential for holding the ground cleared of 
AQI and its local counterparts by his Marine regiments and Army 
brigade.  
But to accomplish that objective—growing the police and 
changing the composition of the army units in the province—tribal 
engagement was indispensable. “What I soon discovered,” said Gaskin, 
“is that there is a direct correlation between tribal engagement and 
recruiting. So that ability to connect the tribes with the cause that both 
of us had in common, getting rid of al Qaeda, and connecting them with 
their government, meant that they needed to be participants in that, both 




That engagement policy, which was launched at the end of 
2005 and expanded during 2006, came to fruition in 2007. The 
significant growth of the police and Iraqi Army in Anbar in 2007 is 
evidence of it. As the numbers illustrate, the size of Iraqi police in 
Anbar grew from approximately 9,000 in December 2006 to roughly 
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25,000 a year later. This increase gave II MEF the capacity to dominate 




E. The Centrality of Engagement 
To be successful in Anbar, the Marines had to be able to 
engage the tribal leaders of the province on their terms. And that 
involved developing a strategy that reflected a sound grasp of Bedouin 
tribal traditions, Islamic principles, and Arab cultural values. I MEF in 
2006 and II MEF the following year embedded that knowledge in their 
shared campaign plan. This was indispensable because engagement is a 
strategic tool in an irregular war . 
Engagement was the key facilitator to solidifying security. 
Gen. Gurganus could not have consolidated the gains of his forces 
without it. The sheikhs provided the men to fill out the ranks of the 
police and army, which was a prerequisite for holding territory and 
denying it to the insurgents. It provided the force multiplier needed to 
win the kinetic fight, and it brought that fight to an end much more 
quickly than II MEF had anticipated.  
Engagement was equally vital in facilitating the initiation of the 
post-conflict phase of the war. Each of the non-kinetic lines of 
operation was dependent on buy-in from the tribal leadership and their 
willingness to take part in the governance process. 
Once in Anbar, Gen. Allen moved to expand tribal 
engagement. The first thing he did was make it a separate line of 
operation within II MEF. It had been part of governance but Allen 
realized that, since engagement was going to be central to everything II 
MEF hoped to accomplish, it needed to be separated from governance. 
This proved to be an astute decision both for the kinetic fight and for 
managing the initial phase of the post-conflict period.  
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F. Post-Conflict Crossover 
According to the counterinsurgency classics, insurgencies can 
take considerable time and effort to degrade and neutralize. This is 
especially true once the insurgents have embeded their secret, below-
the-waterline operational, command, and support units within the 
population. Rooting them out is an arduous and lengthy process. 
Insurgencies are protracted struggles—long and drawn-out affairs, not 
easily reversed.  
Consequently, when II MEF deployed to Anbar in early 2007, 
it expected no immediate drop-off in insurgent violence. The situation 
it inherited from I MEF was improving but gave little hint that it would 
dissipate quickly. No imminent reversal was expected.  
But such a turnaround is exactly what transpired, and it 
happened abruptly. In the week of January 19, 2007, just as II MEF 
was arriving, nearly 450 enemy actions took place in the province. But 
four months later, that number had dropped to roughly 150 incidents. 
And by the beginning of July, it was less than 100, and stayed there 
through mid-September, with a low of just over 50 the first week of 
August, and again in early September.  
“It was a striking drop-off,” said Gen. Allen. “Within 90 days 
of coming over here, virtually the entire situation turned around.”
139
 It 
took II MEF by surprise. However, Allen explained, “While we hadn’t 
planned specifically for it [the sharp drop-off in violence], what we did 
plan for was to recognize it.”
140
 What he meant by this was that II 
MEF’s intelligence shop was looking for indicators that might signal 
change was coming and to capitalize on it. And in March, one of those 
indicators appeared. “Sometime around March we had a meeting … 
where Sheikh Sattar and the Awakening sheikhs were going to meet 
with the governor. They were going to meet with the governor and 
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At the end of that session, one of II MEF’s liaison officers took 
Allen aside and said to him, “I want you to listen to what I’m going to 
say because I think this is pretty important.” He then asked the general 
if he realized that during the “meeting there was never any conversation 
about security or fighting? The entire conversation was about post-
conflict power sharing and economic development. These guys are 
entering their post-conflict period right now,” said the liaison officers. 
The intelligence officers for II MEF came to the same conclusion—
“things were profoundly changing.”
 142
 Then in May came the sharp 
drop-off in violence.  
The crossover point from the kinetic fight to the post-conflict 
phase of COIN came up quickly. The insurgency in Anbar was not 
conforming to the COIN classics. Once more, war—in this case 
irregular war—proved to be unpredictable. For II MEF, this presented a 
strategic opportunity. The forces of Gen. Gurganus had achieved their 
missions, and it was now time to consolidate those gains. II MEF had 
been organized for this moment, for that crossover from conflict to 
post-conflict. Having learned from I MEF and prepared for change, 
they were able to capitalize on that opportunity. 
 
G. From Armed Struggle to Political Competition 
The transition from kinetic operations to governance, 
reconstruction, and rule of law transpired without much warning in the 
late spring. To manage that changeover required a broader array of 
capabilities than those employed in counterinsurgency’s “clear and 
hold” phases. II MEF now confronted the challenges of COIN’s “build” 
period. It had prepared to capitalize on these new conditions in Anbar 
to jumpstart post-conflict activities and manage the transition 
opportunity that appeared in the late spring with the dramatic decline in 
enemy violence. It is important to note, however, that its role was a 
limited one. II MEF could begin the build process, but seeing the 
process through to completion was beyond its responsibility and 
capacity.  
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It is beyond the scope of this study to go into all the specifics 
of the post-conflict activities initiated by II MEF. Suffice it to note that 
by the time they turned over command to I MEF in the early spring of 
2008, the situation in Anbar had undergone a remarkable 
metamorphosis. Consequently, for I MEF the focus in 2008 was on (1) 
completing the professionalization of the Iraqi Security Forces and 
handing off the security mission to them; (2) advancing those non-
kinetic lines of operations that foster reconstruction, economic 
development, and the ascendance of the rule of law; (3) turning over 
responsibility for advancing the post-conflict agenda to I MEF’s 
civilian agency counterparts; and (4) exiting Anbar. 
The goal, said Maj. Gen. John Kelly, commander of I MEF, 
was to build on what II MEF had accomplished the previous year and 
“accelerate the situation toward normalcy.”
143
 By the end of 2008, 
Kelly believed that Anbar had reached that point. Violent actions “were 
down to, at the most, eight or nine a week.” And that number “held for 
the last five, six months” of the year.”
144
 Moreover, I MEF continued 
the “build” process that II MEF started. But while the Marines could 
initiate this phase, once it was underway the civilian agencies had to 





1. For the oil spot strategy to be successful, a certain level of trust 
by the local population is needed. What issues might interfere 
with establishing this trust?  
2. Transitioning between the clearing and the holding phase can 
be fraught with difficulties. One of those is the question of who 
should stay once the clearing has taken place. 
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3. Is it ideal to use the clearing force as the holding force? If the 
clearing phase saw extensive civilian casualties, how might that 
affect the locals’ view of the holding force and their support of 
the insurgents?  
4. What are the alternatives? (See CIWAG case study  An 
Operator’s Guide to Human Terrain Teams by Norman Nigh.) 
5. A second issue is timing and resources: How soon after a 
clearing operation should the holding and building begin? Does 
speed matter? Why? 
6. Defeating an insurgency usually requires a political solution. 
Was there a political aspect to the defeat of the insurgency in 
Anbar? 
7. How would the Marines’ gains have been possible without the 
previous counterterrorism operations?  
8. Does COIN pose a greater threat to insurgents than 
counterterrorism (CT) operations?  
9. Under what circumstances might it be important to use one 
without the other?  
10. What are the risks of carrying out CT operations in the same 
area where you plan to carry out COIN operations? 
11. Counterinsurgency operations are extremely labor-intensive, 
which raises several operational and strategic questions.  
12. How does the risk involved, the commitment of soldiers and 
resources, and the slow progress that is difficult to quantify, all 
create strategic and operational pressures on unit- and 
company-level commanders?  
13. How can commanders make the most use of their forces and 
equipment in a similar operation if restrictions are placed on 
people and resources? 
14. What is the role of time and timing in COIN operations? 
  





 VII. Reflections and Lessons from the Anbar 
Campaign 
 
What the Marine Corps achieved in Anbar constituted a major 
turning point in the Iraq War. Many had declared the fight there lost at 
the very time I MEF was launching a three-dimensional strategy in 
2006 that culminated in 2007 with a strategic defeat for AQI and those 
insurgents aligned with it. And that triumph took place before the Surge 
and the counterinsurgency strategy upon which it was based.  
Like the Surge, the Marine campaign plan for 2006 was based 
on counterinsurgency principles, adapted for the Anbar context. And 
those precepts were applied across the province before FM 3-24 
Counterinsurgency, which served as the strategic basis for the Surge, 
was officially released in December 2006. By then, I MEF was on its 
way to degrading AQI in Anbar. 
In February 2007, Gen. David Petraeus succeeded Gen. George 
Casey in Iraq. He intended to use the Surge forces as part of a new 
strategy based on FM 3-24. By the time he took command in February 
2007, the execution of I MEF’s COIN-based plan, now being advanced 
by II MEF, was reaching the crossover point in Anbar. By the late 
spring the level of violence fell precipitously, and shortly thereafter II 
MEF started the transition to an emphasis on non-kinetic operations.  
The fight for Anbar Province demonstrated the Marine Corps’s 
capacity to learn and change in order to address complicated and very 
violent challenges. The Marine Corps once more proved that it 
possessed this aptitude and that they were up to the task. 
The four-year fight in the Sunni heartland is an important 
illustration of that Marine capacity to improvise and adapt, which is 
infused into the Corps training routines and warrior ethos. As discussed 
earlier, Marines are taught to be prepared to rise above those 
unexpected obstacles always present in combat—what the military 
theorist Carl von Clausewitz called the fog of war.  
Recall that, as Richard Downie noted, military organizations 
that learn and adapt are ones flexible enough to “use new knowledge or 




understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional 
norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous 
gaps in performance and maximize future successes.”
145
 An essential 
ingredient in that capacity to learn is “institutional memory.” It sustains 
“behaviors, mental maps, norms, and values over time.”
146
 
The Corps has an organizational culture that is consistent with 
the learning course of action outlined by Downie. That culture embeds 
in Marines a method of operating that embraces learning and memory. 
Its history is rife with examples of Marines at first being caught in the 
fog of war. But then, having learned from knowledge gained in the 
fight, the Corps shows itself to be flexible enough to make adjustments, 
overcome gaps in performance, and succeed. The Marine Corps has 
demonstrated this adroitness at embracing change at various points in 
its history.  
The campaign in Anbar illustrates these enduring cultural 
norms of learning, memory, and adaptability. In 2004, I MEF found 
itself in the fog of war. While it prepared for deployment by studying 
past experiences in the small wars fought from 1900 through the early 
1930s, as well as by examining COIN practices in Vietnam, the 
situation in the Sunni heartland was not what they expected.
147
  
I MEF was not ready for the kind of insurgency emerging in 
Anbar and, subsequently, suffered ugly surprises. The operational plan 
was not able to survive first contact, and considerable time was spent, 
to paraphrase Gen. Kelly, trying to figure out whether or not those guys 
trying to kill Marines had turned into an insurgency. I MEF lacked 
local intelligence necessary to produce a full profile of the enemy. 
The situation in Anbar became increasingly violent in 2005 as 
al Qaeda made Iraq the main front, the forward edge of the global battle 
with the U.S. In doing so, it pulled out all the stops to inflict a defeat of 
strategic proportions on America. But at the same time, the Marines 
were learning and gaining ground knowledge from that fight.  
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That knowledge of the conflict was plowed into the 
development of I MEF’s 2006 campaign plan. This study details how I 
MEF designed and implemented a counterinsurgency approach that 
was contextualized for Anbar, consisting of (1) the COIN phases of 
“clear, hold, build”; (2) tribal engagement to expand the operating force 
available to maintain local security; and (3) targeted counterterrorism 
aimed at degrading al Qaeda’s clandestine apparatus. These three 
dimensions of the campaign plan were all critical to the Marine success 
in Anbar. That COIN strategy, implemented by I and II MEFs in 2006–
2007, culminated by the end of 2008 in Gen. Kelly’s pronouncement 
that it was now “appropriate to use the term victory in Anbar.”
148
 In 
achieving that state of affairs, the Marines were well served by their 
organizational culture.  
A decade into the twenty-first century reveals that the conflict 
in Iraq is not an anachronism. A persistent and prevalent pattern of 
irregular conflict has emerged, and the trend is here to stay for the 
foreseeable future. The conditions that lead to and foster irregular 
conflicts in various parts of the world— conditions found in weak and 
failing states—are not easily reversed. Over half the world’s states are 
weak, failing, or failed, and are unable to control their territory, 
maintain a monopoly over the use of force, or perform core functions. 
These situations provide opportunities for armed groups to pursue their 
objectives from the local, to the regional, and even to the global level, 
often causing major geopolitical damage. 
Therefore, the lessons from Anbar are not unique to that four-
year battle, and they are not only for the Marines to study. Given the 
persistence of irregular conflict challenges, those lessons will likely 
have an enduring applicability in the years ahead for all U.S. military 
and civilian security institutions. Therefore, they should be assiduously 
examined, dissected, and, where appropriate, institutionalized into 
training, organization, and preparation for future irregular challenges. 
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Here closing reflections are offered, drawn from the narrative. They are 
presented as ten informed observations taken from the Anbar campaign 
that relate to the future irregular conflict environment and to the 
efficacy of counterinsurgency, engagement, and counterterrorism as 
instruments for managing these future challenges. 
 
 
Table 1: Lessons from Anbar 
The case of Anbar illustrates population-centric warfare, and it should 
foster insitutional changes in how Marines and other armed servies 
approach these operations. 
 
 
1. There is no one-size-fits-all plan to respond to population-centric 
warfare. All plans have to be contextualized for the specific 
environment. 
 
2. Contextualizing requires a deep cultural understanding of the local 
population—how they perceive and think about their world, how they 
organize social and political relations. 
 
3. Armed groups are complex and diverse. New frameworks need to be 
conceptualized that can provide detailed knowledge about their 
organizational and operational capabilities. 
 
4. There is no “COIN in a box.” COIN principles mst be customized for 
the context in which irregular warfare takes place. 
 
5. Counterterrorism operations will continue to serve as an important 
complement to counterinsurgency operations. 
 
6. Future counterinsurgency success will require military and political 
advisors who can take a hands-on approach. Their effective mediation 
will help shape the orientation and conduct of diverse local leaders and 
communities. 





7. Holding territory in irregular conflicts once it is cleared requires 
indigenous police forces, and this must be facilitated by engagement. 
 
8. Successful COIN campaigns require effective methods for amassing 
and disseminating timely and accurate local intelligence. 
 
9. The transition from kinetic operations to post-conflict governance, 
reconstruction, and rule of law is a critical period. Post-conflict 
operations must be taken over by the appropriate civilian agencies, not 
continued by the military services. 
 
10. The unexpected will always be present in the fight, and the 
unforseen will always be a challenge. COIN planners and commanders 




First, Anbar is an illustration of population-centric warfare, and 
it should foster institutional changes in how Marines and the other 
armed services approach these operations. New concepts and 
capabilities are needed to manage these irregular fights, as the Anbar 
campaign displayed. Moreover, there is no one-size-fits-all in 
responding to population-centric warfare. The operational concepts for 
succeeding in Anbar were anchored in counterinsurgency doctrine. But 
the COIN plan had to be contextualized for that environment.  
Second, to be able to contextualize necessitates deep cultural 
understanding of the local population, how the people perceive and 
think about their world, and the ways in which they organize social and 
political relations to survive in it. Without this understanding, it will be 
impossible to successfully prosecute future population-centric conflicts. 
In Anbar, this took time to attain. To succeed, the Marines had to be 
able to engage the Sunni tribes and their leaders on their own terms, 
which called for a sound grasp of Bedouin and Arabic tribal traditions, 
Islamic principles, and Arab cultural values. This knowledge came to 




serve as the foundation upon which to build a tribal engagement 
strategy. I MEF in 2006 and II MEF the following year embedded that 
knowledge in their shared campaign plan.  
Third, armed groups are complex and diverse actors not easily 
discerned or figured out. To know this kind of enemy, who will surely 
be present in future irregular conflicts, Marines and soldiers will 
require new methods for profiling the organizational and operational 
capabilities of these diverse non-state actors. New frameworks need to 
be conceptualized to provide commanders with detailed knowledge that 
encompasses the key characteristics of armed groups. By gaining 
understanding of these characteristics, comprehensive depictions can be 
generated and assembled. In Anbar, armed groups comprising the 
insurgency consisted of several clandestine organizations. And the most 
sophisticated of them—AQI—maintained a secret infrastructure with 
sub-units that included intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, 
as well as fighting, financial, logistical, and communications units. 
Fourth, COIN will have a place in future irregular conflicts 
where the objective is to influence and secure the population. Adopting 
a counterinsurgency strategy based on the standard COIN tenets of 
clear-hold-build-transfer and spreading that oil spot was very effective 
in Anbar. But how COIN is applied in the future cannot follow a 
cookie-cutter approach. There is no “COIN in a box,” no blueprint to 
take off the shelf and implement. COIN principles must be customized 
for the context in which irregular war takes place. Those old 
counterinsurgency classics and FM 3-24 can take you only so far; they 
provide a framework but not a blueprint. Future counterinsurgency 
operations will have to be tailored to the fight.  
Fifth, while the new counterinsurgency literature devotes 
considerable attention to non-kinetic lines of operations with an 
emphasis on civil agencies carrying out humanitarian and 
developmental activities, COIN in Anbar was still war, and it still 
involved combat. Success in Anbar began with Marine and Army units 
sweeping the insurgents from the cities and towns spread along the 
Euphrates from Fallujah to the Syrian border. They used firepower and 
maneuvers to attack enemy strongholds, drive the insurgents out, and 
hold that ground after it was cleared. And they were not the only forces 




carrying out combat operations in Anbar; special mission units 
comprised of JSOC operators were also on the ground. While the 
MEF’s force isolated the population from AQI, it did not eliminate its 
clandestine or secret underground. But JSOC units did by directly 
targeting the personnel that populated AQI’s clandestine apparatus. In 
the future, counterterrorism operations will continue to serve as an 
important complement to counterinsurgency campaigns. 
Sixth, to execute successful counterinsurgency programs in 
future conflict environments, the U.S. will need military and political 
advisors who can take a hands-on approach and, through effective 
mediation, help shape the orientation and conduct of diverse local 
leaders and communities. Such advisors must be able to foster 
constructive interaction and cooperation in conflict and post-conflict 
settings where power is characteristically personalized and 
factionalized. An examination of successful counterinsurgency efforts 
in the past demonstrates that individuals with these skills have often 
played key roles. And this narrative illustrates how the Marines and 
their Army counterparts in Anbar began to develop this advisory 
capability, not by design but through on-the-job learning. And when it 
became apparent how important it was to managing the conflict, II 
MEF initiated a training effort to instill advisory skills in officers and 
NCOs down to the company and platoon levels. 
Seven, holding territory in irregular conflicts once it is cleared 
requires indigenous police forces. All the COIN classics stress that 
indigenous police are a key counterinsurgency capability. This again 
proved to be the case in Anbar. The key to holding territory was the 
expansion of Iraqi security forces, especially the police, for they 
provided a persistent presence within the local population. Al Qaeda 
also understood the importance of indigenous police and the dangers 
they posed to its hold on the province. If the ranks of the police came to 
be filled with local tribesmen, they would no longer be able to hide in 
plain sight and would soon be out of business. But increasing the size 
of the police as a part of COIN strategy cannot take place in a vacuum. 
It has to be facilitated by engagement, as can be seen in the Anbar 
experience. 




Eight, successful COIN campaigns require effective methods 
for amassing and disseminating timely and accurate local intelligence. 
That COIN is an intelligence-led fight is one of those other maxims 
found in both classic and current counterinsurgency doctrine. Closely 
connected to this intelligence requirement are two other COIN 
prerequisites discussed above: a physical presence capable of holding 
territory and a strong indigenous police force. In Anbar, these three 
COIN requirements were symbiotically connected. Clearing and 
holding of territory fostered the expansion of police forces, which made 
possible collection of the local intelligence needed to expose AQI’s 
underground organization. No longer could AQI members hide among 
the population. To further exploit this opportunity, II MEF in 2007 
fostered the formation of special police intelligence units that enhanced 
the capacity of the Anbar police to roll up AQI.  
Nine, the transition from kinetic operations to post-conflict 
governance, reconstruction, and rule of law is a critical juncture in all 
counterinsurgency campaigns. Once it begins, managing COIN’s build 
period requires a broader array of capabilities than those employed in 
the clear-and-hold phases. II MEF was ready for that changeover in 
2007. It had organized to jumpstart the processes of governance, 
economic development, and rule of law. And it did so effectively, but 
within limitations. II MEF’s role was a restricted one: it was able to get 
the “build” process started, but the completion of that process was 
beyond its responsibility and capabilities. An important lesson from the 
Anbar campaign is that post-conflict operations, whether they are a part 
of counterinsurgency missions or of other contingencies, are not the 
primary responsibility of the military services. While the U.S. military 
can help initiate this phase, once it is underway the civilian agencies 
have to develop the means to take control of it and bring it to 
completion. 
Ten, in counterinsurgency warfare, as with its conventional 
counterpart, the only constant is that the unexpected will always be 
present in the fight. The unforeseen will challenge COIN campaign 
plans. To deal effectively with the unexpected future, COIN planners 
and commanders must be schooled to expect surprise and be 
predisposed to adapt when unprepared-for events occur. During the 




spring of 2007, the unexpected happened in Anbar, and it happened 
fast. The fight abruptly changed. When II MEF returned to the province 
in the beginning of that year, it anticipated no sharp drop-off in 
insurgent violence any time soon. The conflict had settled into a 
bloody, protracted struggle and, according to the COIN classics, it 
would take considerable time to root the insurgents out. But a sea 
change happened. Within 100 days of arriving, II MEF saw the 
situation virtually turned on its head as insurgent violence dropped 
precipitously. The crossover point from the kinetic fight to the post-
conflict phase of COIN was not by the book. However, to the credit of 
II MEF, its planners had prepared to exploit that turn of events. And 
they did. The result, as Gen. Kelly noted above, was that by the end of 




1. Has doctrine changed in the face of this experience? How can 
we ensure that these lessons will not be lost? 
2. Is the entire organization learning these lessons, or select 
individuals within the organization? How can individual 
learning be transmitted to the organization as a whole?  
3. Would these results have been possible with forces other than 
the Marines? How can other branches of the military learn 
from the Marines? Do they need to? 
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